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VI

JURISDICTION
This case is on appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeals dated April 26,
2001. Jurisdiction of this Court is appropriate pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(a) (2001).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the court of appeals err in ruling that the district court had

jurisdiction over this action when Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1 (1990) expressly
empowers district courts to declare an administrative rule invalid upon a finding that
the rule violates statutory law, that the agency did not have legal authority to make the
rule, or that the rule is not applicable to the aggrieved party?
Standard of Review:
On a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the decision of the court of
appeals for correctness. Clark v. Clark, 2001 UT 44, 1 8, 27 P.3d 538, 540 (citing
Coulter & Smith, Ltd., v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 855 (Utah 1998) and Bear River Mut.
Ins. Co., v. Wall, 1999 UT 33, 1 4, 978 P.2d 460).
2.

Did the court of appeals err in ruling that compliance with the exhaustion

requirement contained in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12 would cause Plaintiffs and the
class members irreparable harm under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1 when the action
is brought as a class action with a de minimis amount at stake for each individual
taxpayer, when dismissal of Plaintiffs' action, due to the statute of limitations, might
result in the loss to class members of much of the refund for illegal taxes paid, and

1

when the Tax Commission has threatened to subject each class member to a
counterclaim or punitive hearing to determine whether any use taxes are owed by such
class member - even without any factual basis to support such a claim?
Standard of Review:
On a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the decision of the court of
appeals for correctness. Clark v. Clark, 2001 UT 44, f 8, 27 P.3d 538, 540 (citing
Coulter & Smith, Ltd., v. Russell 966 P.2d 852, 855 (Utah 1998) and Bear River Mut.
Ins. Co., v. Wall 1999 UT 33, f 4, 978 P.2d 460).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
TO THE APPEAL
Utah Const, art. XIII, § ll(3)(a):
(3)(a) The State Tax Commission shall administer and supervise the
tax laws of the State.
Utah Const, art. XIII, § 11(5):
(5) Notwithstanding the powers granted to the State Tax Commission
in this Constitution, the Legislature may authorize any court established
under Article VIII to adjudicate, review, reconsider, or redetermine any
matter decided by the State Tax Commission or by a County Board of
Equalization relating to revenue and taxation as provided by statute.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12 (1987):
(1) An interested person may petition an agency requesting the
making, amendment, or repeal of a rule.
(2) The division shall prescribe by rule the form for petitions and the
procedure for their submission, consideration, and disposition.
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(3) A statement shall accompany the proposed rule, or amendment or
repeal of a rule, demonstrating that the proposed action is within the
jurisdiction of the agency and appropriate to the powers of the agency.
(4) Within 30 days after submission of a petition, the agency shall
either deny the petition in a writing stating its reasons for the denial, or
initiate rulemaking proceedings in accordance with Section 63-46a-4.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1 (2001):
(1) (a) Any person aggrieved by a rule may obtain judicial review of the
rule by filing a complaint with the county clerk in the district court where
the person resides or in the district court in Salt Lake County.
(b) Any person aggrieved by an agency's failure to comply with
Section 63-46a-3 may obtain judicial review of the agency's failure to
comply by filing a complaint with the clerk of the district court where the
person resides or in the district court in Salt Lake County.
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), a person seeking judicial
review under this section shall exhaust that person's administrative
remedies by complying with the requirements of Section 63-46a-12
before filing the complaint.
(b) When seeking judicial review of a rule, the person need not
exhaust that person's administrative remedies if:
(i) less than six months has passed since the date that the rule
became effective and the person had submitted verbal or written
comments on the rule to the agency during the public comment
period;
(ii) a statute granting rulemaking authority expressly exempts
rules made under authority of that statute from compliance with
Section 63-46a-12; or
(iii) compliance with Section 63-46a-12 would cause the person
irreparable harm.
(3) (a) In addition to the information required by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, a complaint filed under this section shall contain:
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(i) the name and mailing address of the plaintiff;
(ii) the name and mailing address of the defendant agency;
(iii) the name and mailing address of any other party joined in the
action as a defendant;
(iv) the text of the rule or proposed rule, if any;
(v) an allegation that the person filing the complaint has either
exhausted the administrative remedies by complying with Section 6346a-12 or met the requirements for waiver of exhaustion of
administrative remedies established by Subsection (2)(b);
(vi) the relief sought; and
(vii) factual and legal allegations supporting the relief sought.
(b) (i) The plaintiff shall serve a summons and a copy of the complaint as
required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(ii) The defendants shall file a responsive pleading as required by the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(iii) The agency shall file the administrative record of the rule, if any,
with its responsive pleading.
(4) The district court may grant relief to the petitioner by:
(a) declaring the rule invalid, if the court finds that:
(i) the rule violates constitutional or statutory law or the agency does
not have legal authority to make the rule;
(ii) the rule is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in
light of the whole administrative record; or
(iii) the agency did not follow proper rulemaking procedure;
(b) declaring the rule nonapplicable to the petitioner;
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(c) remanding the matter to the agency for compliance with proper
rulemaking procedures or further fact-finding;
(d) ordering the agency to comply with Section 63-46a-3;
(e) issuing a judicial stay o injunction to enjoin the agency from illegal
action or action that would cause irreparable harm to the petitioner or
(f) any combination of Subsections (4) (a) through (e).
(5) If the plaintiff meets the requirements of Subsection (2)(b), the district court
may review and act on a complaint under this section whether or not the
plaintiff has requested the agency review under Section 63-46a-12.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-8 (1953):
Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted
whenever necessary or proper. The application therefor shall be by petition to a
court having jurisdiction to grant the relief. If the application is deemed
sufficient, the court shall, on reasonable notice, require any adverse party,
whose rights have been adjudicated by the declaratory judgment or decree, to
show cause why further relief should not be granted forthwith.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(l)(a) and (f) (1996):
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for
the following:
(a) retail sales of tangible personal property made within the state.
* * *

(f) (i) admission or user fees for theaters, movies, operas, museums,
planetariums, shows of any type or nature, exhibitions, concerts,
carnivals, amusement parks, amusement rides, circuses, menageries,
fairs, races, contests, sporting events, dances, boxing and wrestling
matches, closed circuit television broadcasts, billiard or pool parlors,
bowling lanes, golf and miniature golf, golf driving ranges, batting
cages, skating rinks, ski lifts, ski runs, ski trails, snowmobile trails,
tennis courts, swimming pools, water slides, river runs, jeep tours, boat
tours, scenic cruises, horseback rides, sports activities, or any other
amusement, entertainment, recreation, exhibition, cultural, or athletic
activity;
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(ii) the tax imposed on admission or user fees in Subsection d)(f)(i)
does not affect an entity's sales tax exempt status under Section 59-12104-1.
Utah Admin. R. 865-19S-62 (1999) (Add. Ex. 3):
A.

Meal tickets, coupon books, or merchandise cards sold by persons
engaged in selling taxable commodities or services are taxable,
and the tax shall be billed or collected on the selling price at the
time the tickets, books, or cards are sold. Tax is to be added at
the subsequent selection and delivery of the merchandise or
services if an additional charge is made.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

INTRODUCTION
This is a class action brought on behalf of the named Plaintiffs and a class of

persons and entities who have paid Utah sales tax on the cost of purchasing or
renewing their annual membership in the Costco Wholesale Corporation ("Costco")
and/or WalMart Stores, Inc. d/b/a Sam's Club ("Sam's Club"). The named Plaintiffs
contend that the sales tax is not authorized by the Legislature and, thus, is an illegal
tax improperly created and levied by the Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax
Commission").
The Tax Commission and its lawyers desperately seek to avoid judicial scrutiny
of the Tax Commission's actions in creating and assessing this illegal tax. Not only do
they contend that there is no district court authority to review the Tax Commission's
authority in this regard, but they threaten a process that will ensure that taxpayers will
not challenge their actions. As previously noted by this Court, however, "some form
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of traditional appellate review is essential to ensure that the Tax Commission proper!}
applies relevant law and does not act outside its jurisdiction.''

See Salt Lake City

Corp. v. Property Tax Div. of the Utah State Tax Com'n, 1999 UT 41, <j 20, 979 P.2d
346.
Under Utah law, the Legislature - not the Tax Commission - actually
determines which transactions shall be taxed and then levies the actual sales tax on
those transactions.

In Section 59-12-103 of the Utah Code, the Legislature has

actually levied sales tax on certain enumerated transactions.1 Once those sales taxes
are levied, the Tax Commission then is given the constitutional authority to
"administer and supervise the tax laws of the State." See Utah Const, art. XIII, §
ll(3)(a). "[A]n administrative grant to administer a statute is not to be confused with
a grant of discretion to interpret the statute." Airport Hilton Ventures v. Tax Com'n,
1999 UT 26, 1f 3, n. 4, 976 P.2d 1197.
In Airport Hilton Ventures v. Tax Com'n, the Court reviewed a rule of the Tax
Commission

assessing

accommodations.

sales

tax

on

charges

made

for

guaranteed

hotel

The Court reviewed the rule to determine whether it was "in

harmony with 59-12-103(l)(i)" and, finding that it was not, the Court struck down the
rule.

Id. at 1 8.

The Court instructed that taxation statutes shall be construed

1

Section 59-12-103(1) reads in pertinent part as follows: "(1) There is levied a tax on
the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for the following: . . . ." (Emphasis
added.)
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narrowly, in favor of the taxpayer, leaving it to the Legislature - not to the Tax
Commission - to clarify an intent to be more expansive. See id. at f 9. Any rule that
extends the reach of a taxing statute "beyond what a narrow reading of the statutes
would allow" is invalid. Id. at f 12.
In this case, Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Tax Commission acted outside
the limited statutory authority granted to it by the Legislature when it imposed a sales
tax on the annual membership fees paid by Costco and Sam's Club members. Each
class member's claim in this action totals only approximately $2.50 per year, but the
aggregate amount of the windfall to the Tax Commission already collected through its
illegal tax is believed to be in excess of several million dollars, and that amount will
continue to increase until the courts declare the tax illegal.
The Tax Commission thus far has avoided judicial review of its illegal tax by
seeking dismissal of the action on the grounds that there was not a proper basis for
subject matter jurisdiction in the trial court and that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies. The trial court granted the Tax Commission's motion to
dismiss, ruling that it would be an unconstitutional infringement for the court to decide
the case without allowing the Tax Commission to first address the claim, and, even if
the court had constitutional authority to hear the matter, the case should be dismissed
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The court of appeals correctly reversed the trial court's grant of the motion to
dismiss.

The Legislature has granted district courts the power to declare an
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administrate rule imalid or inapplicable to a petitioner. See Utah Code Ann. § 6346a-12.1 (2001). Nothing in Article XIII, Section 11, of the Constitution of Utah
prevents a district court from exercising this power.

Moreover, to allow a district

court to declare invalid an illegal tax wrongfully imposed by the Tax Commission
would not interfere with or infringe upon the Tax Commission's limited constitutional
authority to "administer and supervise the tax laws of the State." See Utah Const, art.
XIII, § ll(3)(a). Finally, Article XIII, Section 11(5), does not prohibit a district court
from declaring invalid an illegal tax levied by the Tax Commission. See Utah Const.
Art. XIII, § 11(5).2 Indeed, Section 11(5) was added recently to the Constitution to
expand district court authority, expressly granting to the Legislature the power to
authorize district courts to review any matter decided by the Tax Commission. That
grant of power did not limit any authority district courts already had with respect to the
Tax Commission.
Under Section 63-46a-12.1, district courts are specifically empowered to
declare an administrative rule invalid if the agency did not have the legal authority to
make the rule.

2

That power is entirely consistent with the Tax Commission's

Article XIII, Section 11(5) provides as follows:
(5) Notwithstanding the powers granted to the State Tax Commission in
this Constitution, the Legislature may authorize any court established
under Article VIII to adjudicate, review, reconsider, or redetermine any
matter decided by the State Tax Commission or by a County Board of
Equalization relating to revenue and taxation as provided by statute.
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constitutional power to administer and supervise the tax laws. The Tax Commission's
pouer certainly does not extend to imposing or creating taxes that are not levied or
authorized by the Legislature.3 Plaintiffs' action is simply one to have the district
court declare that the Tax Commission has imposed an illegal tax. The trial court,
therefore, had jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' class action and should not have dismissed it
on jurisdictional grounds.
The court of appeals also correctly ruled that the requirement to exhaust
administrative remedies need not be met inasmuch as compliance with that requirement
would cause the Plaintiffs and class members irreparable harm under Section 63-46a12.1. The Tax Commission would have each of the tens of thousands of individual
taxpayers who have paid the illegal sales tax file an independent petition with the Tax
Commission and, if successful on the petition, follow the procedures to obtain a
refund. In contrast to the burden of preparing and filing such a petition, the amount of
the refund for each taxpayer would be only a few dollars. The reality, therefore, is
that few, if any, such taxpayers would undertake the procedure and incur the burden
and expense demanded by the Tax Commission.

In the meantime, the Tax

Commission would retain a windfall from an unauthorized sales tax, while none of the

3

" There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for the
following: . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1) (1996).
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purposes to be served b\ the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies would
be served by first requiring such a procedure before the Tax Commission.
Moreover, to increase the futility of the procedure advocated by the Tax
Commission, the Tax Commission has threatened, on the record in this action, to
single out any Costco or Sam's Club member who attempts to pursue and exhaust their
administrative remedies with a special punitive hearing or counterclaim (despite a total
lack of any basis in fact) in which the Tax Commission will examine the member's
financial records as far back as possible to establish that the member has not paid other
unrelated taxes, such as sales tax in connection with catalog purchases.4
As argued in greater detail below, exhaustion of administrative remedies should
not be required under the circumstances of this case. First, the requirement does not
apply when an agency's statutory authority is challenged. This is purely a question of
law left to the courts. Secondly, as discussed above, requirement of exhaustion here
would be useless and futile, would serve no useful purpose, and would result in
irreparable harm, particularly if the Tax Commission is permitted to follow through
with its threatened punitive actions. Indeed, a class action would serve to provide a
feasible means for asserting the rights of those who would have no realistic remedy if a
class action were not available.

The reasonable, rational approach under the

4

At the hearing in the trial court on the motion to dismiss, the Tax Commission
imperiously threatened to subject any taxpayer to a hearing or counterclaim. {See
Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Dismiss at 20-21, R.258, Add. Ex. 2.)
11

circumstances in this case is to permit the class action to proceed, allowing the trial
court to review the statutory authority for the challenged sales tax.
This Court should affirm the judgment of the court of appeals that the trial court
had subject matter jurisdiction and that exhaustion of administrative remedies would
serve no useful purpose and would cause Plaintiffs and the members of the Class
irreparable harm, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.
B.

SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
On September 30, 1999, the named Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves

individually and any and all persons and entities similarly situated, filed a declaratory
judgment action, seeking an order and judgment that Section 59-12-103(1) does not
authorize a sales tax on the purchase of annual Costco and Sam's Club memberships,
and that the Tax Commission exceeded its statutory authority when it required Costco
and Sam's Club to collect sales tax on the purchase of those memberships, seeking a
refund of any and all such sales taxes that they paid during the class period, together
with interest thereon at the statutory rate.
The Tax Commission moved the trial court to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, including the failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. Oral argument was heard on January 19, 2000. The trial court granted the
Tax Commission's motion to dismiss through a Memorandum Decision dated February
25, 2000, and signed by the trial court on February 28, 2000. (R. 234-39).
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Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal on March 2, 2000. On April 26, 2001.
the court of appeal issued its decision reversing the trial court's order.
On May 10, 2001, the Tax Commission filed its Petition for Rehearing to the
court of appeals. The court of appeals denied the Petition for Rehearing on May 15,
2001.
The Tax Commission filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari on June 12, 2001.
The Court granted a Writ of Certiorari on August 15, 2001.
C.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

Costco and Sam's Club located in Utah both offer several different types

of memberships, including individual memberships, memberships for couples, and
group memberships available to businesses and other organizations. Once purchased,
memberships must be renewed annually for a fee. (Complaint t l 9 and 10, R. 4, Add.
Ex. 1.)
2.

At all times relevant to Plaintiffs' claim, which includes the entire time

prior to the filing of this claim for which wrongfully assessed and collected taxes are
recoverable by the person or entity paying those taxes ("the class period"), the Utah
State Legislature, pursuant to the provisions of the Sales and Use Tax Act (codified in
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-101 et seq.), has imposed a sales tax on the purchaser for the
amount paid or charged for various transactions, including "retail sales of tangible
personal property made within the state" and "admission or user fees" for enumerated
types of "amusement, entertainment, recreation, exhibition, cultural, or athletic
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acthity." See Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103< l)(a) and (f) (1996). (Complaint

cc

11-

14, R. 4-5, Add. Ex. 1.)
3.

At all times during the class period, the Tax Commission has claimed

that it has had, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-210 and § 59-12-118, the statutory
authority to promulgate regulations to implement the provisions of the Sales and Use
Tax Act, and, relying on those statutes, has promulgated the "Sales and Use Tax
Rules" (codified as Utah Admin. R. 865-19S-1 (1999) et seq.), including an
administrative rule entitled "Admissions and User Fees Pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
Section 59-12-102 and 59-12-103," numbered R. 865-19S-33 (1999) (Add. Ex. 4).
(Complaint §§ 15 and 16, R. 5, Add. Ex. 1.)
4.

The Tax Commission has also promulgated an administrative rule entitled

"Meal Tickets, Coupon Books, and Merchandise Cards Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
59-12-103," numbered R.865-19S-62 (1999), and which reads as follows:
A.

Meal tickets, coupon books, or merchandise cards sold by persons
engaged in selling taxable commodities or services are taxable, and the
tax shall be billed or collected on the selling price at the time the tickets,
books, or cards are sold. Tax is to be added at the subsequent selection
and delivery of the merchandise or services if an additional charge is
made.

(Complaint f 17, R.7, Add. Ex. 1.)
5.

Purporting to act pursuant to these statutes and rules, the Tax

Commission has decided that membership fees at Costco and Sam's Club are
"admission" fees and/or the sale of "merchandise cards" and/or are "considered
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taxable as part of the sales price of merchandise or service provided."

The Tax

Commission has. therefore, ordered Costco and Sam's Club to collect the sales tax on
the price for the purchase and renewal of memberships. (Complaint ™ 18-20, R. 7
and 8, Add. Ex. 1.)
6.

Costco and Sam's Club have, in reliance upon the Tax Commission's

claimed authority and its directives, imposed and collected the sales tax on the price of
the purchase and renewal of memberships, and have remitted or intend to remit all
such collected sales tax to the Tax Commission. The named Plaintiffs and each of the
members of the class have paid the sales tax when they purchased new Costco and/or
Sam's Club memberships and each time they purchased renewed memberships.
(Complaint t t 21 and 22, R. 8, Add. Ex. 1.)
7.

Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint that the Tax Commission's levy of a

sales tax on Costco and Sam's Club memberships exceeds the Tax Commission's
authority because the memberships are not part of the sales price of merchandise
purchased at Costco and/or Sam's Club. Membership fees have no relation to either
the quantity or price of merchandise purchased at Costco or Sam's Club, and members
are in no way required to purchase anything at Costco or Sam's Club. (Complaint t
26, R.ll, Add. Ex. 1.)
8.

Plaintiffs further allege in their Complaint that even if Utah Admin. R.

865-19S-62 is properly within the authority of the Commission and is otherwise
enforceable, it is inapplicable to memberships at Costco and Sam's Club because those
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memberships are not a sale of "merchandise cards." While Sam's Club and Costco
both issue membership cards to their members as evidence of membership, the
membership cards are not sold. Membership cards are the property of Sam's Club or
Costco, not the member.

Membership cards are issued solely for Sam's Club and

Costco's administrative purposes to evidence membership.

There is no charge to

replace a lost or stolen membership card. (Complaint 1 25, R. 10-11, Add. Ex. 1.)
9.

The named Plaintiffs and the members of the class, and each and every

one of them, have been damaged by having to pay the wrongfully and unlawfully
imposed and collected Utah Sales Tax on the purchase and/or each renewal of their
Costco and/or Sam's Club memberships. (Complaint f 27, R. 11, Add. Ex. 1.)
10.

A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and

efficient adjudication of this controversy. The members of the Plaintiff class number
in the tens of thousands, and its membership is spread throughout the state of Utah, so
that joinder of all members is impracticable. It would also be impractical for each
member of the class to bring separate actions. The individual damages of any one
class member will be relatively small when measured against the potential costs of
bringing this action, making the expense and burden of this litigation not feasible for
individual actions. In this class action, the trial court could determine the rights of the
named Plaintiffs and all members of the class with judicial economy. (Complaint t
33, R. 13, Add. Ex. 1.)
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11.

In the Complaint, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment requesting the

trial court to declare that the sales tax imposed by the Tax Commission on Costco and
Sam's Club memberships are unlawful, have never been authorized by the Utah Sales
and Use Tax Act, and are outside the authority of the Tax Commission to impose.
Plaintiffs seek an order of the court requiring the Tax Commission to refund, together
with interest, the wrongfully paid taxes. (Complaint ff 36 and 38, R. 16-17, Add.
Ex. 1.)
12.

In their Complaint, Plaintiffs also seek an injunction against the Tax

Commission, enjoining the Commission from requiring Costco and Sam's Club from
assessing and collecting sales tax on the future sales and renewals of their
memberships. (Complaint t 45, R. 19, Add. Ex. 1.)
13.

The Tax Commission has threatened to subject any taxpayer who seeks a

refund of the tax paid on the annual memberships in question to a hearing or
counterclaim to determine whether the taxpayer has failed to pay any use tax in the
past.

The Tax Commission contends it will then use that inquisition to offset any

refund to which the taxpayer might be entitled as a result of paying sales tax on the
taxpayer's membership.

At the hearing before the district court on the Tax

Commission's motion to dismiss, Assistant Attorney General Snelson commented on
the procedure for each member of the class to request a refund as follows:
[EJach of these individuals would have to come in and have some type of
a hearing to establish the individual amounts that they're entitled to. The
Tax Commission is entitled to offset, before refund, any other taxes
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owed. It is my assertion and if this case moves forward it will be our
counterclaim that the Tax Commission is entitled to a counterclaim against
every claimant for any use tax that is not paid by them. Every time you
buy something from Lands end or another catalog or over the internet,
bring that into the State without paying the tax you're liable for the use
tax on that. If they haven't paid that use tax we're entitled to an offset for
any amounts that they've purchased and there, since there's no filing
there's not statute of limitations. We can go back as far as we can obtain
records to determine what those amounts are and we're entitled to that
offset.
(Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Dismiss at 20-21, R. 258, Add. Ex. 2.) Anyone
opting to avail themselves of their right to a refund, therefore, will be singled out for
this discriminatory treatment threatened by the Tax Commission, increasing the futility
and irreparable harm resulting from the exhaustion requirement.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court of appeals correctly ruled that the district court had jurisdiction over
the Plaintiffs' class action for a declaratory judgment that the Tax Commission did not
have the legal authority to impose sales tax on Costco and Sam's Club annual
memberships under the Sales and Use Tax Act, and that the requirement of exhaustion
of administrative remedies under the Utah Rulemaking Act was satisfied in this case.
With respect to jurisdiction, Section 63-46a-12.1 of the Utah Rulemaking Act
expressly authorizes a district court to declare a rule invalid if the court finds that the
rule violates statutory law or the agency does not have the legal authority to make the
rule. The Tax Commission's levy of the sales tax in question violates the Sales and
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Use Tax Act, and the Tax Commission, therefore, exceeded its authority in levying
such tax.
The grant of authority in Section 63-46a-12.1 does not violate Article XIII,
section 11 of the Constitution of Utah, which grants the Tax Commission the power to
'"administer and supervise the tax laws of the State." Moreover, the amendment to
Article XIII contained in section 11(5) - to the effect that the Legislature may
authorize district courts to adjudicate any matter decided by the Tax Commission was a grant of jurisdiction intended to expand - not limit - the authority of district
courts.

The district court continues to have any and all other jurisdiction it had

constitutionally, notwithstanding the amendment.
In the event the district court ultimately determines that the sales tax in question
is illegal, the district court has the power necessary to order the Tax Commission to
refund to the taxpayer class members the amount of illegal tax paid, plus appropriate
interest. The district court has implied powers as are necessary to carry into effect the
judgment it has jurisdiction to enter.

Moreover, the district court has statutory

authority under the Declaratory Judgment Act (Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 et seq.) to
grant such relief as is necessary or proper in connection with its declaratory judgment.
The exercise of such authority would not interfere with the core prerogatives of the
Tax Commission in administering and supervising the tax laws of Utah.
With respect to exhaustion of administration remedies, the court of appeals
correctly ruled that the exhaustion requirement of the Utah Administrative Rulemaking
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Act was satisfied in this case. That act requires a person seeking judicial review to
exliaust the administrative remedy set forth in section 63-46a-12 , but, under section
63-46a-12.1, the person need not exhaust his administrative remedies if compliance
with section 63-46a-12 would cause the person irreparable harm.
Because this is a class action - and there is no provision for a class action
proceeding under either the Sales and Use Tax Act or the Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act - with a de minimis amount at stake for each individual taxpayer,
taxpayers would have no realistic day in court if they were each required to exhaust
their administrative remedies.

Additionally, if this action is dismissed, the class

members could forever lose the right to recover the illegal tax they paid during much
of the class period of this case because of the three-year statute of limitations. Finally,
the Tax Commission has threatened on the record in this case that any class member
who undertakes to exhaust administrative remedies and seeks a refund of the
challenged sales tax would be singled out and subjected to a counterclaim or a punitive
hearing in connection with the refund process in this action. The court of appeals'
conclusion that these circumstances constitute irreparable harm in the context of the
exhaustion requirement is in line with the numerous pronouncements of this Court that
"exhaustion of administrative remedies may not be necessary when it would serve no
useful purpose."

See Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2001 UT 74, \ 14

(quoting State Tax Comm'n v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519, 524 (Utah 1989), and Johnson
v. Utah State Ret. Office, 621 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1980)).
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ARGUMENT
A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE
DISTRICT COURT HAD SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER
PLAINTIFFS' DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION THAT THE TAX
COMMISSION EXCEEDED ITS LEGAL AUTHORITY IN IMPOSING
SALES TAX ON THE PURCHASE OF ANNUAL MEMBERSHIPS
The court of appeals correctly held that the district court had subject matter

jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs' declaratory judgment class action challenging the Tax
Commission's authority to impose sales tax on the purchase of annual memberships to
Costco and Sam's Club, properly rejecting the Tax Commission's contention that it
would be an unconstitutional infringement for the district court to hear the matter
before the Tax Commission first decided it.
1.

The District Court Had Jurisdiction Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a12.1.

Plaintiffs challenge the validity of certain administrative rules pursuant to which
the Tax Commission has imposed the sales tax in question.

The Legislature has

expressly provided that a district court has the authority to review the legality of Tax
Commission rules under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1(l)(a) (2001), which states:
"Any person aggrieved by a rule may obtain judicial review of the rule by filing a
complaint with the county clerk in the district court where the person resides or in the
district court in Salt Lake County." From a plain reading of the statute, such judicial
review does not require a prior adjudicative proceeding by the Tax Commission.
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Moreover, section 63-46a-12.1(l)(a) does not violate the constitutional authority
of the Tax Commission under Article XIII, Section 11. See Salt Lake City Corp. v.
Property Tax Div. of the Utah State Tax Com'n, 1999 UT 41, 1 21, 979 P.2d 346.
Salt Lake City Corp. involved a challenge by Salt Lake City Corporation and Salt Lake
City School District (collectively, "Salt Lake City") of a Tax Commission rule
adopting the "straight line" flight path method for apportioning the taxable value of
commercial airplanes among different taxing entities.5

Salt Lake City relied upon

section 63-46a-12.1 for district court jurisdiction to review the administrative rule, but
the district court held that it did not have jurisdiction, ruling that the Utah Supreme
Court decision in Evans & Sutherland v. Tax Comm'n, 953 P.2d 435 (Utah 1997),
rendered that section unconstitutional and deprived the court of jurisdiction to review
Salt Lake City's challenge to the rule. 1999 UT 41 at f 18. In reversing and holding
that the district court had misconstrued its holding in Evans & Sutherland, this Court
noted that the statute struck down in that case provided for trial de novo in the district
court, which purported to confer on the district court the power to adjust and equalize
the valuation and assessment of property among the several counties - a power
explicitly reserved to the Tax Commission under Article XIII, section 11 of the Utah
5

Prior to adoption of the Tax Commission's rule, Salt Lake City requested a rule,
rejected by the Tax Commission, that would prohibit the straight line method of
assessment and would rely instead on a formula based on the location of landings and
takeoffs, under which Salt Lake City would receive virtually all of the apportioned
revenue.
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Constitution. Id. The Court instructed that "[i]n contexts other than de no\o re\ie\\.
however, we have explicitly authorized traditional appellate re\iew." Id. at c 19. The
Court stated that nothing in Evans & Sutherland deprives the district court of
jurisdiction to review the legality of Tax Commission decisions or rules. Id. Where
Salt Lake City sought a ruling declaring the straight line apportionment rule and
method unconstitutional and illegal, the district court had jurisdiction under Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46a-12.1. Id. at

t21.

Indeed, the Court noted that "some form of

traditional appellate judicial review is essential to ensure that the Tax Commission
properly applies relevant law and does not act outside its jurisdiction."

Id. at f 20

(emphasis added).
Like the plaintiffs in Salt Lake City Corp., Plaintiffs seek a ruling in this case
declaring illegal the Tax Commission's rule relating to the levy of sales tax on the
memberships in question.

That challenge is permissible under section 63-46a-12.1

(2001), which permits the district court, inter alia, to declare the rule nonapplicable to
the Plaintiffs, and to declare an administrative rule invalid if the rule violates statutory
law or the Tax Commission does not have authority to make the rule. See Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46a-12.1(4)(a) and (b) (2001). This case, therefore, involves nothing more
than traditional appellate judicial review of Tax Commission action to ensure that the
Tax Commission properly applies the tax laws and does not act outside its jurisdiction
in levying sales taxes.
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2.

Article XIII, Section 11(5) Of The Utah Constitution Does Not
Require That All Issues Involving Taxation Issues Be Brought Before
The Tax Commission Prior To Judicial Review.

In spite of the clear language of section 63-46a-12.1 and the Court's opinion in
Salt Lake City Corp., the Tax Commission contends that, under Article XIII, section
11(5) of the Utah Constitution, all issues involving taxation must be brought before the
Tax Commission prior to obtaining judicial review.

Indeed, the Tax Commission

apparently takes the position that Article XIII, section 11(5) limits the district court's
authority to hear any tax case other than those on appeal from decisions of the Tax
Commission.

That expansive view is without basis inasmuch as section 11(5) was

added to the Utah Constitution to expand - not limit - district court authority.
Utah Const. Art. XIII, § 11(5) was voted on and approved by the voters of Utah
during the 1998 election to allow this Court to hear appeals from Tax Commission
decisions de novo. Section 11(5) was a grant of jurisdiction, not a limitation.

The

district court continues to have any and all other jurisdiction it has constitutionally
notwithstanding that amendment. For instance, taxpayers have long had ability to go
directly to district court on the following tax issues where no Tax Commission decision
has been issued:
1.

To challenge a tax statute as being unconstitutional as recognized
by this Court in several cases, including Salt Lake City Corp. v.
Property Tax Div. of Utah State Tax Com'n, 1999 UT 41, 979
P.2d 346; Dennis v. Summit County, 933 P.2d 387 (Utah 1997);
V-l Oil Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 942 P.2d 906 (Utah
1997); and Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979);

24

To challenge the \ alidity of a Tax Commission rule under Utah
Code Ann.~§ 63-46a-12.1 (2001);
To obtain a refund of taxes for a class of taxpayers, as recognized
b) this Court in Brumley v. Tax Com'n, 868 P.2d 796 (Utah
1993); Olson v. Salt Lake City School Dist., 724 P.2d 960 (Utah
1986); and Utah Rest. Ass'n v. Davis Cty. Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d
1159, 1163 (Utah 1985);
To issue declaratory rulings in tax cases, as recognized by this
Court in Brumley v. Tax Com'n, 868 P.2d 796 (Utah 1993) (citing
IML Freight v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d 296 (Utah 1975); Walker Bank
& Trust Co. v. Taylor, 15 Utah 2d 234, 390 P.2d 592 (1964);
Clayton v. Bennett, 5 Utah 2d 152, 298 P.2d 531 (1956); and
Crystal Car Line v. State Tax Commission, 110 Utah 426, 174
P.2d 984 (1946));
To recover taxes paid under protest under Utah Code Ann. §§ 591-301 and 59-2-1327 as recognized by this Court in several cases,
including State Tax Commission v. Wright, 596 P.2d 634 (Utah
1979); Peterson v. Bountiful City, 477 P.2d 153 (Utah 1970);
McLaughlin v. Cluff, 66 Utah 245, 240 P. 161 (Utah 1925); Utah
Metal & Tunnel Co. v. Groesbeck, 62 Utah 251, 219 P. 248 (Utah
1923); Nutter v Carbon County, 58 Utah 1, 196 P. 1009 (Utah
1921); Murdock v. Murdock, 38 Utah 373, 113 P. 330 (Utah
1911); and Centennial Eureka Mining Co. v. Juab County, 22
Utah 395, 62 P. 1024 (Utah 1900);
To recover taxes illegally or erroneously assessed under Utah
Code Ann. § 59-3-1321 as recognized by this Court and the Court
of Appeals in several cases, including Utah Parks Co. v. Iron
County, 14 Utah 2d 178, 380 P.2d 924 (Utah 1963); Shea v. State
Tax Comm'n, 101 Utah 209, 120 P.2d 274 (Utah 1941); Wilson v.
Weber Co., 100 Utah 141, 111 P.2d 147 (Utah 1941); Neilson v.
San Pete County, 40 Utah 560, 123 P. 334 (Utah 1912); Blaine
Hudson Printing v. Tax Comm'n, 870 P.2d 291 (Utah Ct. App.
1994); and Stevenson v. Monson, 856 P.2d 355 (Utah Ct. App.
1993); and
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7.

To recover a refund of transitory personal property taxes under
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-402 (as recognized by Rule 6-103(4)(iii)
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration).

When the 1998 constitutional amendment was passed, it did not limit district
court authority on these matters, or alter laws relating to exhaustion of administrative
remedies in any way. The amendment was passed in direct response to the 1997 case
of Evans & Sutherland v. Tax Comm'n, 953 P.2d 435 (Utah 1997), where the Supreme
Court declared the Utah Tax Court unconstitutional.

Indeed, at the same time the

Legislature passed Senate Joint Resolution 13 in 1998, allowing the constitutional
amendment to be placed on the ballot, the Legislature also passed Senate Bill 62
(1998), which explicitly stated that if the Constitutional amendment was approved by
the voters, the tax court language struck down in Evans & Sutherland would be
reinstated.

The reason for both SJR 13 and SB 62 was to overturn Evans and

Sutherland, and thus to expand the district court authority that had been taken away.
In the 1998 voter information pamphlet (Add. Ex. 5), the impartial analysis
regarding the constitutional amendment clearly states that the amendment was passed
to "expand'1 the court's authority to hear appeals from Tax Commission decisions.
The amendment was in no way a limitation. If it had been, the constitutional language
would have said the district court could review "only matters decided by the State Tax
Commission." The amendment did not, and its grant of additional authority to the
district court did not limit the pre-existing district court authority in tax cases.
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Accordingly the district court still has jurisdiction in at least the seven areas listed
above, many of which, including section 63-46a-12.1, apph here.
Moreover, the Tax Commission's decision to impose the sales tax on the
memberships in question obviously satisfied the requirement that the Commission
"decide" the "matter" when it enacted the rule imposing the tax and again when it
required Costco and Sam's Club to collect and remit the tax. See Bluth, 2001 UT App
138 at 1 6.

The Tax Commission would have this Court rule that enactment and

collection of a new tax does not "decide" a matter until a taxpayer formally asks, in an
adjudicative setting, whether the Tax Commission really meant to extract the tax in
question. The court of appeals was correct in concluding that section 11(5) of the
Constitution is satisfied in this case.
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT HAS THE POWER NECESSARY TO FASHION
AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY IN THIS DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
ACTION.
Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment ordering and adjudging that the Tax

Commission exceeded its authority when it required Costco and Sam's Club to collect
sales tax on the purchase of their annual memberships, and a refund of all sales taxes
wrongfully imposed and collected by the Tax Commission in that regard. Complaint
at 2, R. 4 (Add. Ex. 1). The Tax Commission contends, however, that the district
court lacks authority under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1 (2001) to grant the relief
requested, and, therefore, dismissal was appropriate for lack of jurisdiction. See Brief
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of Tax Commission at 39-43.

The Tax Commission's contention ignores both the

district court's implied and statutory powers to carry into effect its power.
If the district court finds that the Tax Commission exceeded its authority and
imposed an illegal sales tax, the district court has both implied and statutory powers as
are necessary to carry into effect the powers expressly given. See United States v.
Clawson, 4 Utah 34, 5 P. 689, aff'd 114 U.S. 477, 5 S. Ct. 949, 29 L. Ed. 179
(1885); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-8 (1953)("Further relief based on a
declaratory judgment or decree may be granted whenever necessary or proper.") For
example, in Utah Rest. Ass'n v. Davis Cty. Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1985),
a food service establishment brought a declaratory judgment action challenging a
permit fee imposed by the Davis County Board of Health by arguing, inter alia, that
the agency exceeded its statutory authority in imposing the fee. The Court held that
the fee was invalid and, as supplemental relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act,
ordered the agency to refund the fees paid by the food service establishment. Id. at
1164.
The Tax Commission relies on Sheppick v. Albertsons, Inc., 922 P.2d 769
(Utah 1996), in support of its argument that this case should be dismissed because the
district court cannot fashion a complete remedy under the Declaratory Judgment Act.
That case is easily distinguishable and has no bearing on the issue of whether the
district court in this case has the authority to order the remedy requested by Plaintiffs.
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Sheppick invoked

a declaratory judgment

action under the Workers'

Compensation Act. An employee originally was awarded permanent total disability
benefits and medical benefits for treatment of a work-related injury to his spine. The
employee subsequently asserted claims in district court against his former employer for
bad faith and unfair dealing in refusing to pay his claim for medical expenses for an
injury to a different part of his spine. The question of whether the employer was
required under the Act to pay medical expenses for the new injury depended upon the
factual finding of whether that injury was caused by the employee's industrial
accident. The Court ruled that the Industrial Commission had exclusive jurisdiction
not only to issue compensation awards authorized by the Act but also to make the
necessary factual findings upon which such awards are made.

"[The plaintiffs]

complaint for a declaratory judgment does not give the district court jurisdiction to rule
on a matter committed to the authority of another adjudicatory body." 922 P.2d at
775. The Court held that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to
make the factual finding necessary to order the requested remedy.

Therefore, any

judgment or decree entered by the district court would be a nullity. Id.
In this case, however, the district court, under Section 63-46a-12.1, has subject
matter jurisdiction to determine whether the Tax Commission had authority to impose
the tax in question. Equipped with subject matter jurisdiction, the district court has the
power under the Declaratory Judgment Act to grant such relief as may be necessary or
proper. The grant of such relief does not depend upon any factual determination of the

29

Tax Commission - particularly not a factual determination mandated b\ statute, as was
the case with the Industrial Commission under the Workers' Compensation Act in
Sheppick.
By entering a declaratory judgment that the Tax Commission has imposed an
illegal tax and, as a consequence, ordering that the illegal tax collected be returned, the
district court would be acting squarely within its authority under the Declaratory
Judgment Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-8 (1953).
Moreover, such authority would not invade the "original jurisdiction" of the
Tax Commission, as the Tax Commission apparently contends.

While the

Commission attempts to paint this case as one involving "a critical issue ... vital to the
Commission in carrying out its constitutionally mandated functions," this case is
nothing of the sort. Beyond pointing out that the Sales and Use Tax Act provides an
administrative process by which the Tax Commission credits or refunds overpayment
of taxes, the Tax Commission has cited no instance in which a declaratory judgment
ordering a refund of an illegally collected tax invades the Tax Commission's core
prerogatives.

The Tax Commission, for example, could still use its administrative

process to credit any ordered refund against any amount of tax, penalty and interest a
particular taxpayer might owe under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-110(2)(a)(i) (2000).
See, e.g., Brumley at 799 (the district court, after deciding the legal issues and
concluding that refunds should be paid, left factual determinations to the Tax
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Commission; "ftjhus, the district court has not interfered with the core prerogathes of
the Commission/').
C.

THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN ITS ANALYSIS AND
CONCLUSION THAT THE REQUIREMENT OF EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IS SATISFIED IN THIS CASE.
Properly concluding that a district court may review the legality of Tax

Commission rules under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1 (2001) without a prior
adjudicative proceeding by the Tax Commission (see Bluth, 2001 UT App 138, \ 6),
the court of appeals then analyzed whether Plaintiffs' declaratory judgment class action
satisfied any requirement to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial
review (id., \\ 7-9). The court of appeals correctly held that the irreparable harm
exception to the exhaustion requirement was established in this action seeking a
declaration that the Tax Commission has acted outside its authority to impose an illegal
sales tax.
1.

Plaintiffs' Declaratory Judgment Action Satisfied The Irreparable
Harm Exception To The Exhaustion Requirement.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1 requires a person challenging administrative
rules to exhaust that person's administrative remedies by complying with Section 6346a-12 before filing the complaint, unless compliance with Section 63-46a-12 would
cause the person irreparable harm.

See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1(2)(a) and

(b)(iii) (2001). The court of appeals correctly concluded that the irreparable harm
exception generally is satisfied in a declaratory judgment action such as this where the
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Plaintiffs challenge the Tax Commission's very authority to impose the tax in question.
See 2001 UT App 138, <[ 7. In so concluding, die court of appeals quoted this Court
in Hercules, Inc. v. Utah State Tea Commission, 1999 UT 12, 974 P.2d 286
("Hercules'*), summarizing the holdings of Brumley v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 868
P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1993) ("Brumley), and IML Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d
296, 298 (Utah 1975), to the effect that "a plaintiff is not generally required to exhaust
its administrative remedies prior to maintaining an action for declaratory relief." 2001
UT App 138, 1 7, quoting Hercules, 1999 UT 12 at f 4. The court of appeals then
proceeded to analyze whether the irreparable harm exception is applicable in this case.
2001 UTApp 138, 1f1 8-9.
Relying on Brumley, the court of appeals appropriately held that the irreparable
harm exception to the exhaustion requirement was satisfied in this case. Like this
case, Brumley was a declaratory judgment action against the Tax Commission brought
by federal retirees seeking a refund of state income taxes paid on retirement income
received from federal sources.

This Court found no error in the trial court's

conclusion that such a declaratory judgment action satisfied the irreparable harm
exception where the action raised legal questions that could not have been finally
determined by the Commission in an administrative hearing. 868 P.2d at 799. The
legal issues raised in Brumley

included whether the rule announced by the U.S.

Supreme Court in Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury should be applied
retroactively, and whether plaintiffs were required to have paid their taxes under
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protest and to ha\e brought their actions for refund within six months thereafter m
district court. 868 P.2d at 799.
In this case, the legal issues arose out of the Tax Commission's administrative
action imposing sales tax on the annual memberships in question and include whether
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1) authorizes the Tax Commission to impose and collect
such a tax, which the Legislature has determined is an appropriate question for the
district court to decide. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1(4)(a) (2001)("The district
court may grant relief to the petitioner by (a) declaring the rule invalid, if the court
finds that . . . the rule violates . . . statutory law or the agency does not have the legal
authority to make the rule"). Like Brumley, this action raises a purely legal question
that could not have been finally determined by the Tax Commission in an
administrative proceeding.
The court of appeals found further support for its holding in the particular
circumstances of this case. In addition to the case involving a challenge to the Tax
Commission's authority to impose the tax in question, the court noted that given the de
minimis amount of money at stake and the threat of counterclaim hearings, exhaustion
of administrative remedies would be futile and useless. 2001 UT 138 at \ 9, citing
Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, 15 Utah 2d 234, 390 P.2d 592, 595 (finding
exhaustion of administrative remedies not required when there is a facial challenge to
scope of agency authority); see also Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2001 UT
74, \ 14 ("Nebeker), quoting State Tax Comyn v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519, 524 (Utah
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1989)f*E\cepuons to [exhaustion] rule exist ... where it appears that exhaustion would
serve no useful purpose"), and Johnson \\ Utah State Ret. Office, 621 P.2d 1234,
1237 (Utah 1980)("Exhaustion of administrative remedies may not be necessary when
it would serve no useful purpose.").6
With respect to the de minimis amount at stake for individual taxpayers, that
circumstance plainly supports the court of appeals' conclusion that the irreparable
harm standard was met in this case. When an illegal tax amounts to only a few dollars
for each individual taxpayer, taxpayers would have no realistic day in court if they
were each required to exhaust their administrative remedies. Cf. Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809, 105 S. Ct. 2965, 2973, 86 L. Ed. 2d 628
(1985)(one of the essential purposes of class actions is to provide a feasible means for
asserting rights of those who "would have no realistic day in court if a class action
were not available"); Crow v. California Department of Human Resources, 325 F.
Supp. 1314, 1316 (N.D. Cal. 1970), cert, denied, 408 U.S. 924, 92 S. Ct. 2495, 33
L. Ed. 2d 335 (1972)("where the class challenge is to widespread administrative

6

In arguing that the court of appeals' holding is clear error, the Tax Commission
contends that the circumstances in this case justifying the irreparable harm exception
should meet the standard of "irreparable injury" in System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon,
669 P.2d 421 (Utah 1983). See Appellant's Brief at 22. "Irreparable injury" in that
case is the standard in Utah to justify injunctive relief and is totally inapposite to the
irreparable harm exception to exhaustion. Moreover, such a standard is clearly
contrary to the jurisprudence of this Court in concluding that exhaustion of
administrative remedies may not be required when it would serve "no useful purpose"
or be "futile and useless" to do so. See Nebeker at 1 14.
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procedures and no individual class member has a financial stake likely to provide the
incentive for individual litigation, class action status should be granted"). Moreover,
in this case there is no provision for a taxpayer class action before the Tax
Commission. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-101 et seq. (1987) and § 63-46a1 et seq. (1997); see also Brumley v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 868 P.2d 796 (Utah
1993) (Supreme Court found no error in trial court's conclusion that there were no
means to certify a class before the Tax Commission).
Additionally, class members could be irreparably harmed if this case were
dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because they might forever
lose the right to recover the illegal tax they paid during much of the period covered by
this case. With a three-year statute of limitations for the refund of taxes paid {see Utah
Code Ann. § 59-12-110(2)(b)), the Tax Commission can be ordered to reimburse
taxpayers for the illegal tax paid from September 1996 forward.

If this case is

dismissed and taxpayers are forced to petition individually, the three-year statute of
limitations may limit reimbursement of the illegal tax to a period three years back from
the new filing date. Thus, the illegal tax collected by the Tax Commission during the
period from September 1996 to the date three years prior to any new filing might not
be reimbursed and might be lost forever to the class members, in itself constituting
irreparable harm.
Finally, the Tax Commission's unwarranted threat to subject each and every
taxpayer seeking a refund of the sales tax at issue here to a separate use tax inquisition
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senes to further increase the futility and irreparable harm that would result from a
proceeding before the Tax Commission.

The exhaustion procedure that the Tax

Commission proposes would single out for special adverse treatment each taxpayer
who appears before it, resulting in a level of deterrence calculated and certain to create
an inappropriate windfall for the State from the illegal tax imposed by the
Commission. While such a procedure might have been appropriate in the era of the
English Star Chamber or Spanish Inquisition, our modern system of justice should not
countenance such a result.7
2.

An Exception To The Exhaustion Requirement Is Particularly
Appropriate In This Class Action.

As made clear by the Utah Supreme Court in Brumley, 868 P.2d 796 (Utah
1993), as verified by Olson v. Salt Lake City School Dist., 724 P.2d 960 (Utah 1986)
and Utah Rest. Ass'n v. Davis Cty. Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Utah 1985),
and based on principles of fundamental fairness to taxpayers, the district court has
jurisdiction and plenary authority to certify a class of plaintiffs in a tax refund case,
and to declare that the grant of a refund to representative plaintiffs be applied to the
class. This exercise of authority by the district court in hearing and ruling on the class
certification and declaratory relief issues does not impinge on any responsibilities of

7

While Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure protects litigants from baseless
claims and allegations, no such protection apparently exists for taxpayers appearing
before the Tax Commission.
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the Tax Commission, and exhaustion of administrative remedies is thus not necessan,
because the Commission does not have authority to certify a class.
The Supreme Court has also made it clear in Greater Park City Co. v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 954 P.2d 873 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) that the companies that collect
sales tax and remit it to the Tax Commission do not have standing to seek a refund.
Accordingly, when widespread over-taxation occurs through relatively small tax
collections that do not warrant individual actions, a class action provides the only
available avenue for relief.
To allow such widespread illegal taxation to go unremedied would be a blatant
disregard of the law and our country's ideals. The right to fair and legal taxation lies
at the heart of our nation, and indeed, was a basic principle upon which the country
was founded. A tax revolt created our nation, and an aversion to unfair taxation has
always been deeply rooted in American political culture.

The principles of fair

taxation established by our forefathers in the Constitution cannot be ignored just
because the illegal taxes paid do not warrant individual actions for recovery.

The

illegitimate taxation in this case must thus be rectified through a class action, and the
requirement of exhaustion would serve no useful purpose. See State Tax Com'n v.
Iverson, supra, and Johnson v. Utah State Ret. Office, supra.
3.

The Decision Is Not In Conflict With Hercules.

The Tax Commission erroneously contends that the court of appeals erred in its
interpretation of Hercules.

See Brief of Tax Commission at 32-34.
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The only

reference to Hercules in the court of appeals' opinion is to quote the proposition that
"a plaintiff is not generally required to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to
maintaining an action for declaratory relief." In that regard, the court of appeals also
cited as support Brumley and Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, supra.
Additionally, the court of appeals specifically addressed the issue whether Plaintiffs'
action qualified for the irreparable harm exception to the exhaustion requirement,
concluding that the action did, without any further reference to or reliance upon
Hercules. See 2001 UT 138 at U 8-9.
The holding of Hercules is inapposite to this case and certainly is not in conflict
with the decision of the court of appeals. Hercules involved an appeal from an order
dismissing Hercules' declaratory judgment action against the Auditing Division of the
Tax Commission. Following an audit, pursuant to law the Auditing Division assessed
corporate franchise tax deficiencies against Hercules.

Hercules disputed the

deficiencies found by the Tax Commission and commenced a formal adjudicative
proceeding before the Tax Commission.

In that proceeding, Hercules moved

unsuccessfully for a protective order precluding the Auditing Division from conducting
discovery.

After denial of the motion and while the adjudicative proceeding was

pending before the Tax Commission, Hercules filed a separate action in district court
seeking a declaration that the Administrative Code did not permit discovery from a
taxpayer. The trial court dismissed the declaratory judgment action "on the grounds
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that the action was an improper attempt to seek judicial review of an interlocutory Tax
Commission order in a pending adjudicative proceeding." 1999 UT 12, c 4.
Hercules asserted that the trial court erred by, in effect, incorrectly requiring
Hercules to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to seeking declaratory relief.
While summarizing the holdings of Brumley and IML Freight, Inc. v. Otto sen, 538
P.2d 296 (Utah 1975), to the effect "that a plaintiff is not generally required to exhaust
its administrative remedies prior to maintaining an action for declaratory relief," this
Court correctly noted that such cases are inapposite. Id. at 1 4. In Hercules - unlike
Brumley and IML Freight - the corporate taxpayer, Hercules, was a party to a pending
formal adjudicative proceeding concerning a factual matter. This Court merely held
that Hercules, as a party to a pending formal adjudicative proceeding, could not
collaterally attack an interlocutory order issued in that proceeding by filing a separate
declaratory judgment action in district court. Id. at t 8.
Neither the outcome of Hercules nor this Court's holding in that case in any
way conflicts with the decision of the court of appeals in this case. The taxpayers in
this case are not parties to a pending formal adjudicative proceeding and have not
attacked an interlocutory order of the Tax Commission in such a proceeding. Indeed,
this Court expressly noted that a case such as this - where the parties were not already
involved in a pending adjudicative proceeding - is inapposite to a case such as
Hercules. Id. at 1 4.
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The Tax Commission is flatly wrong in its contention that it was plain error for
the court of appeals to state that u[i]n this jurisdiction, "a plaintiff is not generally
required to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to maintaining an action for
declaratory relief."'

Brief of Tax Commission at 44-45, quoting Bluth v. Tax

Commission, 2001 UT 138, f 7, quoting Hercules, 1999 UT 12, <[ 4. It is not "plain
error" to quote a proposition directly from an opinion of the Utah Supreme Court.
4.

The Court Of Appeals' Decision Does Not Conflict With Other Utah
Case Law Dealing With Exhaustion Of Administrative Remedies In
Declaratory Judgment Actions.

The Tax Commission cites various cases specifically to show that Utah courts
have dismissed declaratory judgment actions for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. Brief of Tax Commission at 35-36. Those cases, however, are inapposite
to this case. For example, the Tax Commission highlights Baird v. State, 51A P.2d
713 (Utah 1978) as a pertinent case ignored by the court of appeals in its decision.
The Tax Commission cites Baird for the broad proposition that the exhaustion
requirement will not be excused in declaratory judgment actions.

The case says

nothing of the sort, nor is it relevant to the issue of whether compliance with the
exhaustion requirement in Section 63-46a-12 would cause Plaintiffs and the class
irreparable harm.
Baird involved a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of
the Utah OSHA.

The plaintiff merely alleged that he was both employed and an

employer but did not allege any specific injury sustained or threatened to him
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personally as a result of the passage of the Utah OSHA. The case centered on the
plaintiffs abstract allegations concerning the constitutionality of the Utah OSHA, with
the Court holding that the declaratory judgment action could not be maintained because
there was not a justiciable controversy, the plaintiff lacked standing and did not have a
legal interest in the controversy that could be protected, and the issues between the
parties involved were not ripe for judicial determination.
Moreover, in this case, section 63-46a-12.1 expressly provides for declaratory
action by the district court in the context of seeking judicial review of a rule. See,
e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1(4) ("The district court may grant relief to the
petitioner by: (a) declaring the rule invalid, if the court finds that: (i) the rule violates
constitutional or statutory law or the agency does not have the legal authority to make
the rule ....") (emphasis added).8 The issue still remains, of course, whether Plaintiffs
needed to exhaust their administrative remedies under section 63-46a-12, but Baird
does not deal with that issue, i.e., whether compliance with section 63-46a-12 would
cause Plaintiffs and the class irreparable harm, thereby obviating the need to exhaust.
Similarly, the cases of Davis v. Robinson, 871 P.2d 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
and Kunz & Co. v. State, 913 P.2d 765 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), are inapposite. Davis

8

See Utah Restaurant Ass'n v. Davis County Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d 1159, 1162 ml
(Utah 1985)(The Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, which applies to all state
agencies, "expressly provides for declaratory judgment actions to test any agency
rule", citing section 63-46a-13 of the act. That section was repealed in 1990, at the
time section 63-46a-12.1 was enacted, which latter section incorporated declaratory
judgment language.)
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involved a doctor's challenge to disciplinary actions taken against him under the
Medical Practices Act.

The plaintiff doctor filed a declaratory judgment action

asserting that the statutes under which the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing was proceeding were unconstitutional.

The district court dismissed the

action, ruling that the plaintiff should pursue his remedies in the pending
administrative proceeding to revoke his license. The plaintiff appealed to the court of
appeals, which affirmed the dismissal, holding that the plaintiffs remedy under the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act was to petition for judicial review of the final
agency action, which had concluded by that time.
The court of appeals in Davis does not say - as the Tax Commission at least
intimates (see Brief of Tax Commission at 35) ~ that all declaratory judgment actions
should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. That case stands
for the propositions that the Utah Administrative Procedures Act provides for judicial
review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicatory proceedings, and that
a declaratory judgment action may be dismissed if the plaintiff fails to follow that
process. In this case, a process has been established under section 63-46a-12.1 of the
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act that expressly allows for a district court to
declare that a rule violates statutory law or the agency does not have the legal authority
to make the rule. That procedure is expressly available to Plaintiffs and the class they
represent so long as they exhaust their administrative remedy contained in Section 6346a-12 or compliance is not necessary for reasons of irreparable harm. Cases such as
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Davis and Kitnz' are not on point and provide no authority to resolve the pertinent
issue in this case.
Similarly, the Tax Commission cites numerous other cases that likewise do not
pertain to the issue in this case of whether compliance with section 63-46a-12 would
cause irreparable harm to the Plaintiffs and the class they represent. For example, the
Tax Commission cites to cases where writs of mandamus were denied for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. E.g., Bennion v. Sundance Development Corp., 897
P.2d 1232 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)(mandamus action against developer improper plaintiffs complaint was against county commission that approved developer's plat;
under Utah law, plaintiff was required to appeal decision of county commission to the
board of adjustment); Levie v. Sevier County, 617 P.2d 331 (Utah 1980)(mandamus
action to require county commission and county planning commission to approve
subdivision plat dismissed when plat had not been presented to county commission for
approval, as required under state law); and Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning
and Zoning Comm'n, 659 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1983)(plaintiffs failure to appeal

9

Kurtz & Co. v. State, 913 P.2d 765 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), involved a declaratory
judgment action to declare signs on property adjacent to the interstate to be in
compliance with the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act. The court of appeals ruled that
the plaintiff failed to request agency action under UDOT rules, seeking adjudicative
proceedings to determine whether the sign permits should have been granted. The
case does not pertain to the issue in this case whether, under the Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act, Plaintiffs were required to exhaust their administrative remedy under
section 63-46a-12.
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revocation of his building permit to board of adjustment precluded him from seeking
relief from courts by way of mandamus).
In those cases, the plaintiffs attempted to use a writ of mandamus as a substitute
for following the appropriate administrative appeal process set forth by statute. In this
case, the statute expressly permits Plaintiffs to seek district court review, subject only
to compliance with Section 63-46a-12, if necessary.
Finally, the Tax Commission cites a host of other Utah cases for the proposition
that "review of agency decisions should be limited to those cases where administrative
remedies have been exhausted." Brief of Tax Commission at 38-39. Like the other
cases cited by the Tax Commission discussed above, these cases all involved statutes
and issues not even remotely similar to this case where judicial review is expressly
provided under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to the trial court for
further proceedings on the merits.
DATED this 5th day of December, 2001.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

> V ^ i'

pv>if

/jPxmias R. Karrenberg
Scott A. Call
Jon V. Harper
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees
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IN THE TfflRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TYLER W. BLUTH and HEIDI T.
ORME, husband and wife, MICHAEL
VAIL, an individual, AND PETER
WIMBROW, an individual, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly
situated
Plaintiffs,

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and any and all persons and entities similarly
situated, complain against Defendant and allege as follows:
INTRODUCTION
This is a class action, brought on behalf of the named Plaintiffs, and a class of persons
and entities who, at any time during the last five years, have paid Utah Sales Tax on the cost of
purchasing or renewing their membership in the Costco Wholesale Corporation (hereinafter
"Costco") and/or WalMart Stores, Inc. d/b/a Sam's Club (hereinafter "Sam's Club").
The named Plaintiffs and the members of the class are seeking first a declaratory
judgment, ordering and adjudging that the Utah State Tax Commission (hereinafter "the
Commission"), exceeded its statutory authority when it required Costco and Sam's Club to
collect the Utah Sales Tax on the cost of purchasing or renewing Costco and Sam's Club
memberships.
Secondly, Plaintiffs and the members of the class are seeking a refund of any and all
sales taxes which they paid during the class period on the purchase or renewal of Costco
and/or Sam's Club memberships, together with interest thereon at the statutory rate.
PARTIES AND VENUE
1.

Named Plaintiffs Tyler W. Bluth and Heidi T. Orme, husband and wife, are residents of

Salt Lake County, Utah.
2.

Named Plaintiff Michael Vail is a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah.
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3.

Named Plaintiff Peter Wimbrow is a resident of Davis County, Utah.

4.

The Utah State Tax Commission is an entity created by Utah Const, art. XIII. §11,

and Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-201. The Commission is headquartered in Salt Lake City, Utah.
The Commission is responsible for administering the Utah Sales and Use Tax Act, as found in
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102 et seq.
5.

Costco Wholesale Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Costco") is a Washington

corporation, registered with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code to do business
in Utah. Costco owns and operates at least two stores wherein it transacts business in the state
of Utah, county of Salt Lake.
6.

WalMart Stores, Inc., d/b/a Sam's Club (hereinafter referred to as "Sam's Club") is a

Delaware corporation, registered with the Division of corporations and Commercial Code to
do business in Utah. Sam's Club owns and operates at least two stores wherein it transacts
business in the State of Utah, county of Salt Lake.
7.

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-13-7 and 63-30-17.

8.

The Plaintiff class consists of any and all persons and entities who have paid Utah Sales

Tax on the cost of new Costco and/or Sam's Club memberships and/or one or more renewals
of their existing Costco and/or Sam's Club memberships at any time during the class period.
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GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
9.

In order to shop at either of the Costco or Sam's Club warehouses located in Utah, the

consumer must purchase a membership. Costco and Sam's Club both offer several different
types of membership, including individual memberships, memberships for couples, and group
memberships available to businesses and other organizations.
10.

Once purchased, memberships must be renewed annually, and the customer must pay a

fee to renew the membership each year.
11.

At all times relevant to this claim, which includes the entire time prior to the filing of this

claim for which wrongfully assessed and collected taxes are recoverable by the person or entity
paying those taxes (hereinafter referred to as "the class period"), the State of Utah has, pursuant
to the provisions of the Utah Sales and Use Tax Act (codified in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102 et
seq.), imposed a sales tax upon certain transactions.
12.

At all times during the class period, the provisions of the Utah Sales and Use Tax Act

have imposed the sales tax on retail sales of tangible personal property.
13.

At all times during the class period, there has been a statute of the State of Utah,

namely Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(24), which has defined the term "sale" and which has
contained an enumeration of certain types of other transactions which are included within the
definition of "sale."
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14.

At all times during the class period, there has been a statute of the State of Utah. .

namely Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(l)(f), which has imposed Utah Sales Tax on
admission or user fees for theaters, movies, operas, museums, planetariums,
shows of any type or nature, exhibitions, concerts, carnivals, amusement parks,
amusement rides, circuses, menageries, fairs, races, contests, sporting events,
dances, boxing and wrestling matches, closed circuit television broadcasts,
billiard or pool parlors, bowling lanes, golf and miniature golf, golf driving
ranges, batting cages, skating rinks, ski lifts, ski runs, ski trails, snowmobile
trails, tennis courts, swimming pools, water slides,, river runs, jeep tours, boat
tours, other amusement, entertainment, recreation, exhibition, cultural, or
athletic activity.
15.

At all times during the class period, the Commission has claimed that it has had, pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-1-210 and 59-12-118, the statutory authority to promulgate regulations
to implement the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102 et seq., and has promulgated,
pursuant to the above cited sections, the "Sales and Use Tax Rules," (codified as Utah. Admin.
R.865-19S-1 etseq.).
16.

At all times during the class period, there has existed an administrative rule,

promulgated by the Commission, entitled "Admissions and User Fees Pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. Section 59-12-102 and 59-12-103," and number R.865-19S-33, which reads as follows:
A.

"Admission" means the right or privilege to enter into a place. Admission
includes the amount paid for the right to use a reserved seat or any seat in
an auditorium, theater, circus, stadium, schoolhouse, meeting house, or
gymnasium to view any type of entertainment. Admission also includes the
right to use a table at a night club, hotel, or roof garden whether such
charge is designated as a cover charge, minimum charge, or any such
similar charge.
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1.

This applies whether the charge made for the use of the seat, table,
or similar accommodation is combined with an admission charge to
form a single charge, or is separate and distinct from an admission
charge, or is the sole charge.

B.

"Annual membership dues paid to a private organization" includes only
those dues paid by members who, directly or indirectly, establish the level
of the dues.

C.

"Season passes" include amounts paid to participate in specific activities,
once annual membership dues have been paid.

D.

If the original admission charge carries the right to remain in a place, or to
use a seat or table, or other similar accommodation for a limited time only,
and an additional charge is made for an extension of such time, the extra
charge is paid for admission within the meaning of the law. Where a
person or organization acquires the sole right to use any place or the right
to dispose of all of the admissions to any place for one or more occasions,
the amount paid is not subject to the tax on admissions. Such a transaction
constitutes a rental of the entire place and if the person or organization in
turn sells admissions, sales tax applies to amounts paid for such admissions.

E.

Annual membership dues may be paid in installments during the year.

F.

Amounts paid for the following activities are not admissions or user fees:
1.

lessons, public or private;

2.

sign up for amateur athletics if the activity is sponsored by a state
governmental entity, or a nonprofit corporation or organization, the
primary purpose of which, as stated in the corporation's or
organization's articles or bylaws, is the sponsoring, promoting, and
encouraging of amateur athletics;

3.

sign up for participation in school activities.
Sign up for
participation in school activities excludes attendance as a spectator
at school activities.
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G.

17.

If amounts charged for activities listed in F. are billed along with
admissions or user fees, the amounts not subject to the sales tax must be
listed separately on the invoice in order to remain untaxed.

At all times during the class period there has existed an administrative rule,

promulgated by the Commission, entitled Meal Tickets, Coupon Books, and Merchandise
Cards Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 59-12-103," and number R.865-19S-62, which
reads as follows:
A.

18.

Meal tickets, coupon books, or merchandise cards sold by persons engaged in
selling taxable commodities or services are taxable, and the tax shall be billed
collected on the selling price at the time the tickets, books, or cards are sold.
Tax is to be added at the subsequent selection and delivery of the merchandise
or services if an additional charge is made.

On information and belief Plaintiffs allege that, purporting to act pursuant to Utah

Admin. R.865-19S-33, representatives of the Commission have determined that membership
fees at Costco and Sam's Club are "admission" fees and have therefore ordered and directed
Costco and Sam's Club to, at all times during the class period, impose and collect the Utah
Sales Tax on the price for the purchase and renewal of memberships that permit the member
shop at Costco or Sam's Club.
19.

On information and belief Plaintiffs allege that, purporting to act pursuant to Utah

Admin. R.865-19S-62, representatives of the Commission have determined that membership
fees at Costco and Sam's Club are for the sale of "merchandise cards" and have therefore
ordered and directed Costco and Sam's Club to, at all times during the class period, impose
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and collect the Utah Sale Tax on the price for the purchase and renewal of memberships that
permit the member to shop at Costco or Sam's Club.
20.

On information and belief Plaintiffs allege that, purporting to act pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. § 59-12-103(1) representatives of the Commission have determined that membership fees
at Costco and Sam's Club are "considered taxable as part of the sales price of merchandise or
service provided" and ordered and directed Costco and Sam's Club to, at all times during the
class period, impose and collect the Utah Sales Tax on the price for the purchase and renewal of
memberships that permit the member to shop at Costco or Sam's Club.
21.

At all times during the class period Costco and Sam's Club have, in reliance upon the

Commission's purported authority under Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33, R.865-19S-62, Utah
Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1), and the directives of the Commission, imposed and collected the
Utah Sales Tax on the price for the purchase and renewal of memberships, and, on information
and belief Plaintiffs allege that Costco and Sam's Club have remitted, or are intending to remit,
all such collected sales tax to the Commission.
22.

At all times during the class period, the named Plaintiffs and each of the members of the

class have, when they purchased new Costco and/or Sam's Club memberships and each time
they purchased renewed memberships, paid the Utah Sales Tax.
23.

Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33, as interpreted by the Commission to require the collection

of the Utah Sales Tax on the purchase and renewal of Costco and Sam's Club memberships is,
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and at all times during the class period has been, illegal, null, void, and unenforceable for
reasons, including but not limited to the following:
A.

Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33, as interpreted by the Commission, does not find
support in, does not comport with and is contrary to the provisions of the Utah
Sales and Use Tax Act.

B.

Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33, as interpreted by the Commission, exceeds the
authority of the Commission to promulgate regulations for the reason that it
does not interpret, construe, implement, or enforce any existing statute of the
state of Utah.

C.

Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33, as interpreted by the Commission, exceeds the
authority of the Commission to promulgate regulations for the reason that,
without the benefit of any legislative authority, it creates a new category of
transaction to which the Utah Sales Tax would apply.

23.

Even if the Commission's interpretation of Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33 is properly within

the authority of the Commission and is otherwise enforceable, it is inapplicable to memberships
at Costco and Sam's Club because those memberships are not within the definition of
"admissions." Membership at Costco or Sam's Club is not required to gain access to those
facilities, but rather is required before purchases may be made at those facilities.
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24.

Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62, as interpreted by the Commission to require the collection

of the Utah Sales Tax on the purchase and renewal of Costco and Sam's Club memberships is,
and at all times during the class period has been, illegal, null void, and unenforceable for
reasons, including but not limited to the following:
A.

Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62, as interpreted by the Commission, does not find
support in, does not comport with and is contrary to the provisions of the Utah
Sales and Use Tax Act.

B.

Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62, as interpreted by the Commission, exceeds the
authority of the Commission to promulgate regulations for the reason that it
does not interpret, construe, implement, or enforce any existing statute of the
state of Utah.

C.

Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62, as interpreted by the Commission, exceeds the
authority of the Commission to promulgate regulations for the reason that,
without the benefit of any legislative authority, it creates a new category of
transaction to which the Utah Sales Tax would apply.

25.

Even if the Commission's interpretation of Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62 is properly within

the authority of the Commission and is otherwise enforceable, it is inapplicable to memberships
at Costco and Sam's Club because those memberships are not a sale of "merchandise cards."
Payment of membership fees at Costco and Sam's Club entitles a member to shop at Costco or
10

Sam's Club and, while Sam's Club and Costco both issue membership cards to their members as
evidence of those memberships, the membership cards are not sold. Membership cards are the
property of Sam's Club or Costco, not the member. Membership cards are issued solely for
Sam's Club and Costco's administrative purposes to evidence membership. There is no charge
to replace a lost or stolen membership card.
26.

The Commission's directive, purportedly based upon Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1), to

Costco and Sam's Club to collect sales tax on memberships because they are "considered taxable
as part of the sales price of merchandise" exceeds the Commission's authority because Costco
and Sam's Club memberships are not part of the sale price of merchandise purchased at Costco
and/or Sam's Club. Membership fees have no relation to either the quantity or price of
merchandise purchased at Costco or Sam's Club, and members are in no way required to
purchase anything at Costco or Sam's Club. Membership simply entitles the member to
purchase merchandise at Costco or Sam's Club at a price determined by Costco and/or Sam's
Club.
27.

The named Plaintiffs and the members of the class, and each and every one of them, have

been damaged by having to pay the wrongfully and unlawfully imposed and collected Utah Sales
Tax on the purchase and/or each renewal of their Costco and/or Sam's Club memberships.
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CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
28.

Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons and entities.
29.

The Class shall include all persons and entities who, at any time during the class period

purchased and/or renewed a Costco and/or Sam's Club membership, and who were charged the
Utah Sales Tax on the cost of the membership purchase and/or renewal(s). It is reasonable to
anticipate that: a.) some members of the class will have been Costco and/or Sam's Club members
prior to the commencement of the class period, and will accordingly only have paid Utah Sales
Tax on one or more annual membership renewals during the class period; b.) additional members
of the class will have become members during the class period, and will have paid Utah Sales
Tax both on an original membership and on one or more renewals; and c.) some members will
have joined Costco and/or Sam's Club for the first time within the last year, and others will have
joined during the class period but never renewed their memberships, with the consequence, in
either instance, that they will have paid Utah Sales Tax only on an original membership. All
such persons and entities, including the named Plaintiffs, shall be collectively referred to herein
as the "Class" or the "members of the Class."
30.

The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members of the Class as Plaintiffs herein is

impracticable. The named Plaintiffs allege based upon information and belief that there are tens
of thousands of persons and entities who are members of the Class.
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31.

The claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of all members of the Class,

regardless of when they became Costco and/or Sam\s Club members, and all members of the
Class sustained damages arising out of the same wrongful conduct of the Commission, which is
in violation of Utah law, as described herein.
32.

The named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. They

have retained counsel competent and experienced in class action litigation. Their counsel are
regularly and continuously engaged in the prosecution of a large number of class acion lav/suits
in both state and federal courts, both in Utah and in a number of other jurisdictions.
33.

A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication

of the controversy. The members of the Class number in the tens of thousands, and its
membership is spread throughout the State of Utah, so that joinder of all members is
impracticable. It would also be impracticable for each member of the Class to bring separate
actions. The individual damages of any one Class member will be relatively small when
measured against the potential costs of bringing this action, making the expense and burden of
this litigation unjustifiable for individual actions. In this class action, the court can determine the
rights of the named Plaintiffs and all members of the Class with judicial economy. The named
Plaintiffs do not anticipate any difficulty in the management of this suit as a class action.
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34.

The common questions of law and fact that exist as to all members of the Class and

clearly predominate o\ei any questions affecting solely individual members of the Class include.
but are not limited to, the following:
a.

Whether the Commission has, or at any time during the Class period had, the
authority to interpret Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33 or Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62
to require payment of Utah Sales Tax on Costco and Sam's Club memberships.

b.

Whether Utah Admin. R.865-10S-33 or Utah Admin. R. 865-19S-62, as
inteipreted by the Commission to require payment of Utah Sales Tax on Costco
and Sam's Club memberships, properly and lawfully implements any statute of
the State of Utah pertaining to sales tax.

c.

Whether, based upon its interpretation of Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33 or Utah
Admin. R.865-19S-62 as requiring payment of Utah Sales Tax on Costco and
Sam's Club memberships, the Commission can, or at any time during the class
period could, lawfully require Costco and/or Sam's Club to impose and collect
Utah Sales Tax on the purchase or renewal of Costco and/or Sam's Club
memberships.

d.

Whether Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33 or Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62. is now. or
has been at any time during the class period, applicable to the purchase or renewal
of Costco and/or Sam's Club memberships.
14

Whether Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1) authorizes the Commission to require
Costco and Sam's Club to collect Utah Sales Tax on purchase or renewal of
Costco and/or Sam's Club memberships because said memberships "are
considered taxable as part of the sales price of merchandise or service provided."
Whether the Commission must refund all of the Utah Sales Tax paid, during the
Class period, by the Plaintiffs and the members of the class on the purchase and
renewal of Costco and/or Sam's Club memberships.
Whether the Commission must pay the Plaintiffs and members of the class
interest on all monies which it has received or will receive from Costco and/or
Sam's Club as a result of the collection, by Costco and/or Sam's Club, of sales
tax on the purchase and renewal of Costco and/or Sam's Club memberships.
If the Plaintiffs and the members of the class are entitled to recover interest then
it will be necessary to determine the applicable rate of interest and the date or
dates from which interest will be assessed.
Whether the members of the class are entitled to an order enjoining the
Commission from any further attempts to enforce Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33,
Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62, or Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1) in any way that
compels Costco and Sam's Club to assess and collect Utah Sales Tax on initial
and renewal memberships.
15

35.

The party opposing the Class has acted on grounds that are universally applicable to the

Class, thereby making final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to
the class as a whole appropriate.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Declaratory Judgment - Refund of Taxes Paid)
36.

Plaintiffs and the members of the Class are, based upon all of the foregoing allegations,

which are incorporated herein as though set out in full, seeking a Declaratory Judgment for the
refund, together with interest, of wrongfully paid taxes pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12110.
37.

There is an actual controversy within the jurisdiction of this Court, and declaratory relief

will provide an effective and efficacious means for terminating uncertainty and resolving
controversy by adjudicating the rights and interests of the parties with respect to the following
acts and events:
a.

the Commission has enforced and will, absent an order from this court, continue

to enforce Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33 and Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62, by requiring
Costco and Sam's Club to impose and collect Utah Sales Tax on the purchase and
renewal of memberships;
b.

Costco and Sam's Club have assessed and collected and will, absent an order

from this Court, continue to assess and collect Utah Sales Tax on the purchase and
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renewal of their memberships, and have remitted or will remit this tax to the
Commission; and,
c.

The Plaintiffs and members of the Class have been compelled to pay and will,

absent an order from this Court, continue to be compelled to pay Utah Sales Tax on the
purchase and renewal of their Costco and/or Sam's Club memberships.
38.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 et seq., this Court has the authority to declare

that Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33 and Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62, as interpreted by the
Commission to require payment of Utah Sales Tax on Costco and Sam's Club memberships,
are not now and, during the Class period, never have been lawful, in that such interpretations
are not now and, during the Class period, never have been authorized by the Utah Sales and
Use Tax Act, Utah Code Ann. §59-12-101 et seq. and that such interpretations do not now
properly implement and, during the Class period, never have properly implemented any
provision of Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-12-103(f) and 59-12-102(l)(b).
39.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 et seq., this Court has the authority to declare

that Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33 and Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62 are not now and, during the
Class period, never have been applicable as a matter of fact and of law to initial and renewal
memberships at Costco and/or Sam's Club.
40.

This Court has the authority to declare that, because Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33 and

Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62 are unlawful as interpreted by the Commission or inapplicable on
17

the facts of this case, Costco and Sam's Club should not be and should not have been required
to assess and collect Utah Sales Tax on the purchase or renewal of Costco and Sam's Club
memberships and, upon doing so, the Court has the authority to order the Commission to
refund to the Plaintiffs and members of the Plaintiff Class any and all funds that have been or
that may be paid to the Commission as a result of the collection by Costco and Sam's Club, at
any time since the commencement of the Class period, of Utah Sales Tax on the purchase and
renewal of memberships.
41.

This Court has the authority to declare that nothing in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)

authorizes the Commission to require Costco and Sam's Club to collect and remit Utah Sales Tax
on the purchase and renewal of Costco and/or Sam's Club memberships because the
Commission's determination that memberships *6are considered taxable as part of the sales price
of merchandise or service provided" is factually and legally in error.
42.

This Court has the authority to determine that interest is payable on any funds that must

be refunded by the Commission to the Plaintiffs and the members of the Plaintiff Class and if
so, to determine the applicable rate of interest and the date or dates from which interest is
payable and, upon doing so, this Court has the authority to determine the amount of interest
due to Plaintiffs and the members of the Plaintiff Class and to order that such interest be paid
by the Commission to the Plaintiffs and the members of the Plaintiff Class.
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43.

This Court has the authority to make all such other, further and additional rulings as are

needed fully and completely to resolve any and all issues that are raised by this Complaint.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Declaratory Relief - Injunction)
44.

Plaintiffs and the members of the Class are, based upon all of the foregoing allegations,

which are incorporated herein as though set out in full, seeking a Declaratory Judgment
providing for injunctive relief, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 et seq.
45.

This Court has the authority to declare that, because Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33 and

Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62 are unlawful as interpreted by the Commission or inapplicable to
the facts of this case, and because nothing in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1) gives the
Commission authority to require Costco and Sam's Club to collect and remit Utah Sales Tax
on the purchase and renewal of Costco and/or Sam's Club memberships as "part of the sales
price of merchandise," the Commission cannot require Costco and Sam's Club to collect Utah
Sales Tax on any future purchases or renewals of Costco and Sam's Club memberships and
upon doing so the Court has the authority to order the Commission to inform Costco and
Sam's Club that Utah Sales Tax should no longer be assessed and collected on the purchase or
renewal of memberships, and to enjoin the Commission from requiring Costco and Sam's Club
to assess and collect Utah Sales Tax on the purchase or renewal of memberships.
WHEREFORE, THE PLAINTIFFS PRAY FOR RELIEF AS FOLLOWS:
19

A.

That the Court order, adjudge, decree and declare, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-

33-1 et seq., that Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33 and Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62. as interpreted
by the Commission to require Costco and Sam's Club to collect and remit Utah Sales Tax on
their membership fees, are, and, at all times since the commencement of the class period, have
been either unlawful or inapplicable to the purchase or renewal of Costco and Sam's Club
memberships and that nothing in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1) authorizes the Commission
to order Costco and Sam's Club to collect and remit Utah Sales Tax on their membership fees
as "part of the sales price of merchandise."
B.

That the Court order, adjudge, decree and declare that, because Utah Admin. R.865-

19S-33 and Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62 are unlawful or inapplicable and because Utah Code
Ann. § 59-12-103(1) does not authorize the Commission to require Costco and Sam's Club to
collect and remit Utah Sales Tax on their membership fees, Costco and Sam's Club should not
be and, at all times since the commencement of the Class period, should not have been
required to assess and collect Utah Sales Tax on the purchase or renewal of Costco and Sam's
Club memberships.
C.

That the Court order, adjudge, decree and declare that, because Utah Admin. R.865-

19S-33 and Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62 are unlawful or inapplicable, and because Utah Code
Ann. § 59-12-103 does not authorize the Commission to require Costco and Sam's Club to
collect and remit Utah Sales Tax on their membership fees, the Plaintiffs and members of the

Plaintiff Class should not be and, at all times since the commencement of the Class period,
should not have been required to pay Utah Sales Tax on the purchase or renewal of Costco
and/or Sam's Club memberships.
D.

That the Court order the Commission to refund to the Plaintiffs and members of the

Plaintiff Class any and all funds that have been or that may be paid to the Commission as a
result of the collection by Costco and Sam's Club, at any time after the commencement of the
Class period, of Utah Sales Tax on the purchase and renewal of memberships.
E.

That the Court make all determinations necessary to compute the amount of interest that

is due to the Plaintiffs and members of the Class under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-402(2) on any
and all funds that have been or that may be paid to the Commission as a result of the collection
by Costco and Sam's Club, at any time after the commencement of the Class period, of Utah
Sales Tax on the purchase and renewal of memberships and that the Court order the
Commission to pay interest to the Plaintiffs and the members of the Plaintiff Class in the
amount that the Court determines is due.
F.

That the Court order the Commission to inform Costco and Sam's Club that Utah Sales

Tax should no longer be imposed on the purchase or renewal of memberships, and enjoin the
Commission from requiring Costco and Sam's Club to collect Utah Sales Tax imposed on the
purchase or renewal of memberships.
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G.

That the Court make all such other, further, and additional rulings as are needed in

order to fully and completely resolve any and all issues that are raised by this Complaint.
H.

For such other and further relief as is just and equitable in the premises.
DATED: S e p t e m b e r ^ 1999.
GORDON LAW OFFICES, CHARTERED
and
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

Thomas R. Karrenberg
Scott A. Call
Victoria Coombs Bushnell
Attorney for Plaintiffs and the Class
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1

every one of those individuals and refunded over $2 million

2

to each of those individuals on our own.

3

" The Tax Commission wants to get it right.

They

4

want to do it right.

5

somebody's head and extorting money.

6

setup and could and would, if it was found that this money

7

was collected improperly, refund it to all the individuals.

8
9

They're not out there putting guns to
The Tax Commission is

Now the only irreparable harm would be that Mr.
Karrenberg wouldn't get his fees.

I mean, that's not

10

irreparable harm.

The Tax Commission can address this harm

11

to each individual.

12

fee at the Tax Commission. There's no requirement of being

13

represented by counsel.

14

with no particular format, to file a claim.

15

problem is that each of these individuals would have to

16

come in and have some type of a hearing to establish the

17

individual amounts that they're entitled to.

18

Commission is entitled to offset, before refund, any other

19

taxes owed.

20

forward it will be our counterclaim that the Tax Commission

21

is entitled to a counterclaim against every claimant for

22

any use tax that is not paid by them.

23

something from Lands End or another catalog or over the

24

internet, bring that into the State without paying the tax

25

you're liable for the use tax on that.

They can come in.

There's no filing

They can file a written letter
And the other

The Tax

It is my assertion and if this case moves

Every time you buy

If they haven't
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1

paid that use tax we're entitled to an offset for any

2

amounts that they've purchased and there, since there's no

3

filing there's no statute of limitations.

4

as far as we can obtain records to determine what those

5

amounts are and we're entitled to that offset.

6

We can go back

Mr. Karrenberg has talked about Brumlee.

Brumlee

7

went to the Court because they raised a constitutional

8

challenge to the statute that could not be decided by the

9

Tax Commission.

That's the only reason the Court took

10

Brumlee is because what they were challenging is the

11

constitutionality of the Utah taxing scheme.

12

Commission doesn't have authority to rule on the

13

constitutionality of the taxing scheme.

14

constitutional question here.

15

asked to apply their own rules and interpret the taxing

16

statute, something that they have the constitutional

17

authority and duty to do and something that they do every

18

single day.

19

The Tax

There's no

The Tax Commission simply

In Johnson the Court stated that the mere

20

introduction of a constitutional issue does not obviate the

21

need for exhaustion of administrative remedies.

22

even if there was a constitutional question it doesn't

23

necessarily mean that you can go straight to District

24

Court.

25

Therefore,

And then, in the Walker case, briefly
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Service: LEXSTATO
Citation: U.A.C. R865-19S-62

U.A.C. R865-19S-62 (1999)UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
Copyright © 1990, 1993-1999 by The State of Utah and
LEXIS Law Publishing,
a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties, Inc.
All rights reserved.
* " * THIS SECTION IS CURRENT THROUGH JUNE 1, 1999 —
TAX COMMISSION
R865. AUDITING.
R865-19S. SALES AND USE TAX.
U.A.C. R865-19S-62 (1999)
R865-19S-62. Meal Tickets, Coupon Books, and Merchandise Cards Pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. Section 59-12-103.
A. Meal tickets, coupon books, or merchandise cards sold by persons engaged in selling
taxable commodities or services are taxable, and the tax shall be billed or collected on the
selling price at the time the tickets, books, or cards are sold. Tax is to be added at the
subsequent selection and delivery of the merchandise or services if an additional charge is
made.
AUTHORITY:

Utah Code Section 10-1-303, 10-1-306, 26-32a-101 through 26-32a-113, 59-1-210, 59-12
HISTORY: 9819, AMD, 03/1 7/89; 9820, AMD, 03/1 7/89; 9952, AMD, 06/02/89; 10232,
AMD, 1 1/24/89; 10233, AMD, 1 1/24/89; 10234, AMD, see CPR; 10234, CPR, 03/05/90;
10395, AMD, 03/01/90; 10399, NSC, 12/2 7/89; 10400, NSC, 12/2 7/89; 10401, NSC, 12/2
7/89; 10402, NSC, 12/2 7/89; 10679, AMD, 07/12/90; 10680, AMD, 07/12/90; 10681, AMD,
07/12/90; 10682, AMD, 07/12/90; 10731, AMD, 08/03/90; 10732, AMD, 08/03/90; 10733,
AMD, see CPR; 10733, CPR, 10/15/90; 10734, NSC, 07/11/90; 10736, AMD, see CPR;
10736, CPR, 10/15/90; 10900, NSC, 07/11/90; 10901, NSC, 07/11/90; 10902, NSC,
07/11/90; 10904 to 10911, NSC, 07/11/90; 10917, AMD, see CPR; 10917, CPR, 12/01/90;
10983, NSC, 07/25/90; 10984, NSC, 07/25/90; 11015, NSC, 08/20/90; 11087, AMD,
11/02/90; 11098, AMD, 12/13/90; 11099, AMD, 1 1/20/90; 11159, NSC, 10/01/90; 11215,
AMD, 0 1/28/91; 11216, AMD. 0 1/28/91; 11217, AMD, 01/07/91; 11218, AMD, 01/07/91;
11219, AMD, 12/13/90; 11456, NSC, 02/15/91; 11457, NSC, 02/15/91; 11534, NSC,
02/15/91; 11535, NSC, 02/15/91; 11560, NSC, 02/15/91; 11561, NSC, 02/15/91; 11636,
AMD, 0 5 / 2 8 / 9 1 ; 11649, AMD, see CPR; 11649, CPR, 09/05/91; 11657, AMD, 07/01/91;
11658, AMD, 07/01/91; 11845, AMD. 09/04/91; 11972, NSC, 08/15/91; 11973, NSC,
08/15/91; 12853, AMD, 08/18/92; 12854. AMD, 07/15/92; 13187, AMD, 09/29/92; 13348,
NSC, 10/01/92; 13498, NSC, 11/01/92. 13781, AMD, see CPR; 13781, CPR, 04/14/93;
13949, AMD, 0 1/27/93; 14069, AMD, 02/16/93; 14257, NSC, 03/31/93; 14320, AMD,
05/17/93; 14413, AMD, see CPR; 14413, CPR, 08/02/93; 14500, AMD, 07/01/93; 14600,
AMD, 09/02/93; 14601, AMD, 09/02/93; 14602, AMD, 09/02/93; 14657, AMD, 09/02/93;
14893, NSC, 10/01/93; 14993, NSC, 11/01/93; 15369, AMD, 03/14/94; 15621, AMD,
04/07/94; 15757, NSC, 05/01/94; 15804, AMD, 06/24/94; 15805, AMD, 06/24/94; 15806,
AMD, 06/24/94; 15849, AMD, 08/23/94; 15850, AMD, 07/19/94; 16062, AMD, 09/21/94;
16185, NSC, 10/01/94; 16186, NSC, 10/01/94; 16187, NSC, 10/01/94; 16273, NSC,
11/01/94; 16388, AMD, 02/13/95; 16869, NSC, 06/01/95; 16870, AMD, 07/06/95; 16871,
AMD, 07/06/95; 16900, AMD, 07/06/95; 16901, AMD, 07/06/95; 17010, AMD, 08/15/95;

Tetneven_m=59a8b9586fd2c2d39969365c5ed5fB57«S:_fmtstr=FULL&_docnum=l

17060, AMD, 08/15/95; 17190, AMD, 10/24/95; 17009, AMD, see CPR; 17009, CPR,
12/19/95; 17285, AMD, 01/01/96; 17561, AMD, 04/23/96; 17562, AMD, 04/23/96; 17563,
AMD, see CPR; 17563, CPR, 05/29/96; 17654, NSC, 04/30/96; 17743, AMD, 07/25/96;
17744, AMD, 07/25/96; 17862, AMD, 08/20/96; 17863, AMD, 08/20/96; 17889, NSC,
09/30/96; 17910, AMD, 09/24/96; 17970, AMD, 09/24/96; 18021, NSC, 09/30/96; 18062,
AMD, 10/22/96; 18064, AMD, 10/22/96; 18065, AMD, 10/22/96; 18066, AMD, 10/22/96;
18067, AMD, 10/22/96; 18068, AMD, 10/22/96; 18059, NSC, 10/31/96; 18163. NSC, 1
1/30/96; 18229, AMD, 12/20/96; 18278, AMD, 0 1/28/97; 18279, AMD, 0 1/28/97; 18336.
AMD, see CPR; 18336, CPR, 03/21/97; 18403, AMD, 03/21/97; 18404, AMD, 03/21/97;
18588, AMD, 03/21/97; 18725, NSC, 04/28/97; 18201, NSC, 04/30/97; 19280, 5YR,
05/22/97; 19251, NSC, 06/06/97; 19245, AMD, 07/03/97; 19406, AMD, 08/21/97; 19407,
AMD, 08/21/97; 19408, AMD, 08/21/97; 19409, AMD, 08/21/97; 19410, AMD, 08/21/97;
19422, AMD, 08/21/97; 19442, AMD, 08/21/97; 19750, NSC, 11/01/97; 19931, AMD,
U/05/97; 19932, AMD, 11/05/97; 20828, AMD, 05/04/98; 21195, AMD, 08/11/98; 21220,
AMD, 08/11/98; 21323, AMD, 10/14/98.
NOTES:
NOTES CONSTRUING PORTIONS OF THIS RULE OR FORMER, SIMILAR RULE
ADMISSION.
"Admission" is defined in terms of the right to enter a place and not in terms of a fee
charged to use facilities or equipment within a place; the definition merely incorporates the
plain and settled meaning of "admission." Therefore, the Tax Commission's decision that an
indoor entertainment mall was liable for an admission tax on the activities of roller skating,
batting cages, and laser tag was incorrect since these were only fees charged to do particular
things. (Former R865-19-33S.) 49th Street Gallena v. Tax Comm'n. 860 P.2d 996 (Utah a .
Ap_p. 1993J, cert, denied, 87_8.P.2d 1154 (Utah 19941.
APPLICATION.
Seller of modular units to dealers before the units were permanently attached sold tangible
personal property, not improvements to real estate or completed homes. Therefore, seller
owed sales tax pursuant to his statutory duty to collect and remit taxes. (Former R865-58S1.) Valgardson Hou.s_.Sys. v. State Tax Comm n, 849 P.2d 618 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied,
859 P.2d 585__UJ.a_.1993)
This rule applies to the resale of an item traded in as part of a purchase price, but not
subsequent use other than a resale. (Former R865-19-72S.) KnowJe.dge_Data.Sys._v,. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 865 P.2d 1387 (Utan Ct. App. 1993).
Because sales tax is not levied on real property transfers, a real property contractor, a
contractor who purchases materials and incorporates those materials into real property
improvements, is considered the ultimate consumer of the property for purposes of imposing
a sales tax. Therefore, although taxpayer entered into a joint venture agreement in which coventurer was responsible for installation, taxoayer remained the real property contractor as
he was ultimately responsible for installation and consequently he remained liable for the
taxes assessed. (Former R865-19-58S.) Nieoemauser Ornamental8_Metal Works Co._y._Tax
Comm n, 858 P.2d 1034 (Utan C: Ape 1993,. cert, denied, 870 P.2d.957.(Utah 1994J.
COMPUTER SERVICES.
- PRIMARY OBJECT OF SALE.
When manufacturing company provided comouter company engineering drawings to be
scanned and converted into a computer-readable form, the transaction was primarily a
service, not a new taxable purcnase of tangible personal property that the customer did not
previously own. Eaton Kenway, lnc v Auditing Div. of Utah.StateJax Comm'n, 906_P.2d 882
(Utah 1995).
-- SOFTWARE MAINTENANCE.
This provision of this rule, making charges for computer software maintenance taxable
(R865-19S-92(B)), is in harmony with § 59-l2-103(l)(g). South Cent._Utah Tel. Ass'n v.
retneve°_m=59a8b9586fd2c2d39969365c5ed5fE57&_fmtstr=FULL&_docnum=l&_staitd
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Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 951 P.2d 218 (Utah 1997^.
CONSTRUCTION WITH STATUTES.
Rule R865-19S-79, promulgated by the tax commission, was beyond the scope of the
commission's power and invalid, because it added other criteria to the statute determining
taxability, extending the reach of the transient room tax and sales tax beyond what a narrow
reading of the statute would allow. Airport Hilton Ventures. Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 976
Pt2d U 9 7 (Utah 1999).
CONSUMER.
A contractor who has not purchased materials cannot be an ultimate consumer of the
materials and therefore cannot be liable for sales and use tax. The key in identifying the final
consumer is ownership. Therefore, using the Tax Commission's own criteria for identifying an
exempt sale, a high school contracting for construction work was the actual and constructive
purchaser of the construction materials because it (1) directly issued purchase orders for
materials, (2) issued checks for materials directly to vendors, (3) took title in its own name,
(4) inspected and stored the materials on its own property, (5) insured those materials, (6)
assured that associated warranties ran to itself, (7) exercised direct supervision, and (8)
explicitly reserved in its contract with the contractor the right to purchase and donate any
materials to the project that it chose. (Former R865-19-58S.) Thorup Bros. Constr. v.
Auditing Div, of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 860 P.2d 324 (Utah 1993V
Although a contract specified that the plaintiff never held title to construction materials,
where he issued purchase orders for the transactions, received invoices from vendors, issued
checks to pay for the materials, and was required under the terms of the contract to insure
the materials, the indicia of sale were sufficient to support a finding that he was the final
consumer of the materials before they were incorporated into real property. Yearoin. Inc. v.
Tax_ Comm'n. 977 P.2d 527 (Utah Ct. ADD. 1999V
EQUIPMENT.
These rules expressly excluded real property and improvements to real property from the
definition of equipment, as that term was used in § 59-12-104. Therefore, the building shells
of manufacturing facilities were not equipment and were subject to tax. (Former R865-1985S.) Morton IntVInc.v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah
1991).
FINANCING FOR IMPROVEMENTS.
A lease agreement, prior to the sale of an improvement to real estate, does not change the
nature of the improvement so that it becomes taxable as a sale of tangible personal property
under § 59-12-103. The rationale for not taxing the sale of improvements to real estate
under these rules is based on the policy of taxing the final consumer of the personal property,
the one who converts the personal property into real property. These rules suggest that
determination of a tax assessment should be based on the physical process of conversion, not
on how the conversion is financed. (Former R865-19-58S.) Superior Soft Water Co. v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 843 P.2d 525 (Utan Ct. App. 1992).
INFORMATION.
The lease or sale of knowledge, information, or data such as mailing lists was taxable as a
personal property transaction when the information was conveyed by a tangible medium such
as printed sheets and magnetic tapes. (Former R865-19-26S.) Mark 0. Haroldsen, Inc_\L
State Tax ComnrVn, 805_P.2d 176 (Utah 1990).
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
The Commission properly levied sales tax on sales by a wholesale construction supply store
(the taxpayer) to out-of-state customers of goods that were delivered to those customers by
the store's agents or were picked up by the customers at the taxpayer's place of business,
when the taxpayer failed to keep adequate records with regard to its sales and was unable to
produce the necessary exemption certificates. (Former R865-235.) TummurruTrades,. Inc. v.
Tetrieve?jn«59a8b9586fd2c2d39969365c5ed5^
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Utah State Tax Comm'n. 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 19901.
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT EXEMPTION.
- NEW OR EXPANDING OPERATIONS.
The provision of this rule defining "new or expanding operations" to require that
manufacturing, processing, or assembling activities must be "substantially different in nature,
character, or purpose from pnor activities" (R865-19S-85) is inconsistent with § 59-12-104
and improperly restricts the availability of sales tax exemptions to new products or services
Newspaper Agency Com, v. Utah Sfete Tax Comm'n. 892 P.2d 17 (Utah Ct. ADD. 1995), cert.
granted, 910 P.2d 425 fUtah 1995V
The provision of this rule defining "new or expanding operations" to require that
manufacturing, processing, or assembling activities must be "begun in a new physical plant
location in Utah" (R865-19S-85) is contrary to § 59-12-104 and impermissibly limits the
availability of the sales tax exemption. Newspaper Agency Core, v. Utah State Tax Comm'n
892P.2d 17 (Utah Ct. APD. 19Q5V cert, granted, 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995V
A sale will be exempt if it qualifies under one of the subparts of R865-19S-85(A)(3) even if
it fails under the other two subparts. Eaton Kenwav. Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax
Comm'n. 906 P.2d 8B2 fUtah 1QQSV
R865-19S-85(A)(3)(a) reasonably defines "new operations" and is therefore valid. Eaton
Kenwav. Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 906 P.2d 882 (Utah 19951.
R865-19S-8S(A)(3)(c) reasonably defines "expanding operations" as manufacturing
activities that "increase production or capacity" and properly excludes taxable "normal
operating replacements," a term taken directly from § 59-12-104(15). Eaton Kenwav. Inc. v.
Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 906 P.2d 882 (Utah 19951.
-

NORMAL OPERATING REPLACEMENTS.
R865-19S-85(A)(6) properly limits "normal operating replacements" to machinery and
equipment that replace existing machinery and equipment of a "similar nature";
replacements that are not of a "similar nature" are not "normal operating" replacements and
thus are eligible for the exemption provided in § 59-12-104(15). Eaton Kenwav, Inc. v.
Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 906 P.2d 882 (Utah 19951.
The language of both § 59-12-104(16) and R865-19S-85 confirms that the normal
operating replacements limitation applies to both new and expanding operations; therefore,
because the Commission reasonably found that petitioner's printing presses were "normal
operating replacements" and because the normal operating replacements limitation applies to
both new and expanding operations, petitioner was not entitled to an exemption under § 5912-104(16). Newspaper Agency Corp. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 938 P.2d
266 (Utah 1997).
-

REPLACEMENT OF EXISTING MACHINERY.
Even though new machine clearly increased company's production and capacity, the
commission correctly found that the machine replaced "existing machinery or equipment of a
similar nature" under R865-19S-85. Eaton Kenwav. Inc. v. Auditing Div, of Utah State Tax
Comm n, 906 P.2d 882JUtah 1995)
The Supreme Court, applying Eaton Kenway, Inc. v. Auditing Div.. 906 P.2d 882, 887 (Utah
1995y, which stated that "modernizing and upgrading machinery and equipment are normally
done in the regular course of business, even though the replaced items may be in good
working order/' and reversing the appellate court's decision, held that this rule is "reasonable
and fairly defines "normal operating replacements'" and valid. Newspaper_Agency Cgrp^j/^
Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm n, 938 P.2d 266_£Utah_l§2ZX.
MANUFACTURER.
The Tax Commision's rule defining "manufacturer" was invalid because it improperly
restricted the manufacturing sales tax exemption set forth in § 59-12-104(16). (Former
R865-85S-1.) Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm^J46_P^2d
1304 (Utah 1993J.

MINING.

Company owning and operating a phosphate mine which transported ore to its fertilizer
plant via a pipeline owned and operated by a separately incorporated common carrier was
liable for the sales tax on electricity furnished by the company to the carrier. SF_Phospnates
Ltd. Co. v. Auditing Div.. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 972 P.2d 384 (Utah 19981.
PASSAGE OF TITLE.
These rules codified the requirements for determining when title passes and adopted the
passage-of-title test for fixing the moment for determining the tax. Therefore, because
taxpayer did not pass title until delivery, he was obligated to collect and remit sales tax on
his transportation charges. (Former R865-19-71S.) Hales Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Audit Div.,
842 P.2d 887 (Utah 1992V
REPAIR OR RENOVATIONS.
These rules did not support taxing, drilling and milling services on logs a railroad company
had previously purchased. The commission's view that drilling and milling are equivalent to
repair or renovation is unsupportabie; repair and renovation suggest activities that "fix" an
already manufactured product. The authority to tax services performed on items owned by
the taxpayer is not coextensive with the authority to tax based on services performed pnor to
sale. (Former R865-19-51S.) union Pac. R.R. v. Auditing Div.. 842 P.2d 876 (Utah 1992V
RESIDENT.
The Utah State Tax Commission has clearly defined the term bona fide nonresident for
purposes of the sales tax exemption. Although the commission's regulation included an
expanded definition of the term "resident" for sales tax purposes beyond the general common
law definition of resident, this is consistent with the well established principle that state tax
exemption statutes are to be strictly construed against the party claiming the exemption.
(Former R873-22-1M.) Putvm v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 837 P.2d 589 (Utah Ct. ADD. 1992^.
WARRANTY AGREEMENTS.
The provision of this rule which taxes the purchase of extended warranty agreements
(R865-19S-78(H)) is in harmony with § 59-12-103(l)(g). South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n v.
Auditing Diy.^JLUtaiLStateJTax Comm'n, 951 P.2d 218 (Utah 1997^.
CITED.
For cases citing this rule or similar former rules, see BJ.-Titan Servs. v. State Tax Comm'n.
842 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992): Heritage Convalescent Ctr. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 953 P.2d
445 (Utah 1997J.
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TAX COMMISSION
R865. AUDITING.
R865-19S. SALES AND USE TAX.

U.A.C R865-19S-33 (1999)
R865-19S-33. Admissions and User Fees Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sections 59-12-102
and 59-12-103.

A. "Admission" means the right or privilege to enter into a place. Admission includes the
amount paid for the right to use a reserved seat or any seat in an auditorium, theater, circus,
stadium, schoolhouse, meeting house, or gymnasium to view any type of entertainment.
Admission also includes the right to use a table at a night club, hotel, or roof garden whether
such charge is designated as a cover charge, minimum charge, or any such similar charge.
1. This applies whether the charge made for the use of the seat, table, or similar
accommodation is combined with an admission charge to form a single charge, or is separate
and distinct from an admission charge, or is the sole charge.
B. "Annual membership dues paid to a private organization" includes only those dues paid by
members who, directly or indirectly, establish the level of the dues.
C. "Season passes" include amounts paid to participate in specific activities, once annual
membership dues have been paid.
D. If the original admission charge carries the right to remain in a place, or to use a seat or
table, or other similar accommodation for a limited time only, and an additional charge is
made for an extension of such time, the extra charge is paid for admission within the
meaning of the law. Where a person or organization acquires the sole right to use any place
or the right to dispose of all of the admissions to any place for one or more occasions, the
amount paid is not subject to the tax on admissions. Such a transaction constitutes a rental
of the entire place and if the person or organization in turn sells admissions, sales tax applies
to amounts paid for such admissions
E. Annual membership dues may be paid in installments during the year.
F. Amounts paid for the following activities are not admissions or user fees:
1. lessons, public or private;
2. sign up for amateur athletics if the activity is sponsored by a state governmental entity, or
a nonprofit corporation or organization, the primary purpose of which, as stated in the
corporations or organization s articles or bylaws, is the sponsoring, promoting, and
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encouraging of amateur athletics;
3. sign up for participation in school activities. Sign up for participation in school activities
excludes attendance as a spectator at school activities.
G. If amounts charged for activities listed in F. are billed along with admissions or user fees,
the amounts not subject to the sales tax must be listed separately on the invoice in order to
remain untaxed.
AUTHORITY:
Utah Code Section 10-1-303, 10-1-306, 26-32a-101 through 26-32a-113, 59-1-210. 59-12
HISTORY: 9819, AMD, 03/1 7/89; 9820, AMD, 03/1 7/89; 9952, AMD, 06/02/89; 10232,
AMD, 1 1/24/89; 10233, AMD, 1 1/24/89; 10234, AMD, see CPR; 10234, CPR, 03/05/90;
10395, AMD, 03/01/90; 10399, NSC, 12/2 7/89; 10400, NSC, 12/2 7/89; 10401, NSC, 12/2
7/89; 10402, NSC, 12/2 7/89; 10679, AMD, 07/12/90; 10680, AMD, 07/12/90; 10681, AMD,
07/12/90; 10682, AMD, 07/12/90; 10731, AMD, 08/03/90; 10732, AMD, 08/03/90; 10733,
AMD, see CPR; 10733, CPR, 10/15/90; 10734, NSC, 07/11/90; 10736, AMD, see CPR;
10736, CPR, 10/15/90; 10900, NSC, 07/11/90; 10901, NSC, 07/11/90; 10902, NSC,
07/11/90; 10904 to 10911, NSC, 07/11/90; 10917, AMD, see CPR; 10917, CPR, 12/01/90;
10983, NSC, 07/25/90; 10984, NSC, 07/25/90; 11015, NSC, 08/20/90; 11087, AMD,
11/02/90; 11098, AMD, 12/13/90; 11099, AMD, 1 1/20/90; 11159, NSC, 10/01/90; 11215,
AMD, 0 1/28/91; 11216, AMD, 0 1/28/91; 11217, AMD, 01/07/91; 11218, AMD, 01/07/91;
11219, AMD, 12/13/90; 11456, NSC, 02/15/91; 11457, NSC, 02/15/91; 11534, NSC,
02/15/91; 11535, NSC, 02/15/91; 11560, NSC, 02/15/91; 11561, NSC, 02/15/91; 11636,
AMD, 05/28/91; 11649, AMD, see CPR; 11649, CPR, 09/05/91; 11657, AMD, 07/01/91;
11658, AMD, 07/01/91; 11845, AMD, 09/04/91; 11972, NSC, 08/15/91; 11973, NSC,
08/15/91; 12853, AMD, 08/18/92; 12854, AMD, 07/15/92; 13187, AMD, 09/29/92; 13348,
NSC, 10/01/92; 13498, NSC, 11/01/92; 13781, AMD, see CPR; 13781, CPR, 04/14/93;
13949, AMD, 0 1/27/93; 14069, AMD, 02/16/93; 14257, NSC, 03/31/93; 14320, AMD,
05/17/93; 14413, AMD, see CPR; 14413, CPR, 08/02/93; 14500, AMD, 07/01/93; 14600,
AMD, 09/02/93; 14601, AMD, 09/02/93; 14602, AMD, 09/02/93; 14657, AMD, 09/02/93;
14893, NSC, 10/01/93; 14993, NSC, 11/01/93; 15369, AMD, 03/14/94; 15621, AMD,
04/07/94; 15757, NSC, 05/01/94; 15804, AMD, 06/24/94; 15805, AMD, 06/24/94; 15806,
AMD, 06/24/94; 15849, AMD, 08/23/94; 15850, AMD, 07/19/94; 16062, AMD, 09/21/94;
16185, NSC, 10/01/94; 16186, NSC, 10/01/94; 16187, NSC, 10/01/94; 16273, NSC,
11/01/94; 16388, AMD, 02/13/95; 16869, NSC, 06/01/95; 16870, AMD, 07/06/95; 16871,
AMD, 07/06/95; 16900, AMD, 07/06/95; 16901, AMD, 07/06/95; 17010, AMD, 08/15/95;
17060, AMD, 08/15/95; 17190, AMD, 10/24/95; 17009, AMD, see CPR; 17009, CPR,
12/19/95; 17285, AMD, 01/01/96; 17561, AMD, 04/23/96; 17562, AMD, 04/23/96; 17563,
AMD, see CPR; 17563, CPR, 05/29/96; 17654, NSC, 04/30/96; 17743, AMD, 07/25/96;
17744, AMD, 07/25/96; 17862, AMD, 08/20/96; 17863, AMD, 08/20/96; 17889, NSC,
09/30/96; 17910, AMD, 09/24/96; 17970, AMD, 09/24/96; 18021, NSC, 09/30/96; 18062,
AMD, 10/22/96; 18064, AMD. 10/22/96; 18065, AMD, 10/22/96; 18066, AMD, 10/22/96;
18067, AMD, 10/22/96; 18068, AMD, 10/22/96; 18059, NSC, 10/31/96; 18163, NSC, 1
1/30/96; 18229, AMD, 12/20/96; 18278, AMD, 0 1/28/97; 18279, AMD, 0 1/28/97; 18336,
AMD, see CPR; 18336, CPR. 03/21/97. 18403, AMD, 03/21/97; 18404, AMD, 03/21/97;
18588, AMD, 03/21/97; 18725, NSC. 04/28/97, 18201, NSC, 04/30/97; 19280, 5YR,
05/22/97; 19251, NSC, 06/06/97; 19245. AMD, 07/03/97; 19406, AMD, 08/21/97; 19407,
AMD, 08/21/97; 19408, AMD, 08/21/97; 19409, AMD, 08/21/97; 19410, AMD, 08/21/97;
19422, AMD, 08/21/97; 19442, AMD. 08/21/97; 19750, NSC, 11/01/97; 19931, AMD,
11/05/97; 19932, AMD, 11/05/97; 20828, AMD, 05/04/98; 21195, AMD, 08/11/98; 21220,
AMD, 08/11/98; 21323, AMD, 10/14/98.
NOTES:
NOTES CONSTRUING PORTIONS OF THIS RULE OR FORMER, SIMILAR RULE
ADMISSION.
. retneve°_m=91 Oe722e549a2addl c9c6a6798d9516&_fmtstr*FULL&_docnum=l &_stand 9/27/1999

"Admission" is defined in terms of the right to enter a place and not in terms of a fee
charged to use facilities or equipment within a place; the definition merely incorporates the
plain and settled meaning of "admission." Therefore, the Tax-Commission's decision that an
indoor entertainment mall was liable for an admission tax on the activities of roller skating,
batting cages, and laser tag was incorrect since these were only fees charged to do particular
things. (Former R865-19-33S.) 49th Street Gallena v. Tax Comm'n. 860 P.2d 996 (Utah Ct.
ADD. 1993). cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994).
APPLICATION.
Seller of modular units to dealers before the units were permanently attached sold tangible
personal property, not improvements to real estate or completed homes. Therefore, seller
owed sales tax pursuant to his statutory duty to collect and remit taxes. (Former R865-58S1.) Valaardson Hous. Svs. v. State Tax Comm'n. 849 P.2d 618 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied,
859 P.2d 585 (Utah 19931.
This rule applies to the resale of an item traded in as part of a purchase price, but not
subsequent use other than a resale. (Former R865-19-72S.) Knowledge Data Svs. v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n. 865 P.2d 1387 (Utah Ct. ADD. 19931.
Because sales tax is not levied on real property transfers, a real property contractor, a
contractor who purchases materials and incorporates those materials Into real property
improvements, is considered the ultimate consumer of the property for purposes of imposing
a sales tax. Therefore, although taxpayer entered into a joint venture agreement in which coventurer was responsible for installation, taxpayer remained the real property contractor as
he was ultimately responsible for installation and consequently he remained liable for the
taxes assessed. (Former R865-19-58S.) Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co. v. Tax
Comm^_8_5_8_P.2d 1Q34 (Utah Ct. Apj. 1993), cert, denied, 870 P.2d 957 (Utah 1994^.
COMPUTER SERVICES.
- PRIMARY OBJECT OF SALE.
When manufacturing company provided computer company engineering drawings to be
scanned and converted into a computer-readable form, the transaction was primarily a
service, not a new taxable purchase of tangible personal property that the customer did not
previously own. EatoiLKenway, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 906 P.2d 882
(Utah 1995).
-

SOFTWARE MAINTENANCE.
This provision of this rule, making charges for computer software maintenance taxable
(R865-19S-92(B)), is in harmony with § 5 9 - 1 2 - 1 0 3 ( l ) ( g ) . South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n v.
Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 951_Ps2d 218 (Utah 19971.
CONSTRUCTION WITH STATUTES.
Rule R865-19S-79, promulgated by the tax commission, was beyond the scope of the
commissions power and invalid, because it added other criteria to the statute determining
taxability, extending the reach of the transient room tax and sales tax beyond what a narrow
reading of the statute would allow. Airport Hilton Ventures. Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n. 976
P.2d 1197 (Utah 1999).
CONSUMER.
A contractor who has not purchased materials cannot be an ultimate consumer of the
materials and therefore cannot be liable for sales and use tax. The key in identifying the final
consumer is ownership. Therefore, using the Tax Commission's own criteria for identifying an
exempt sale, a high school contracting for construction work was the actual and constructive
purchaser of the construction materials because it (1) directly issued purchase orders for
materials, (2) issued checks for materials directly to vendors, (3) took title in its own name,
(4) inspected and stored the materials on its own property, (5) insured those materials, (6)
assured that associated warranties ran to itself, (7) exercised direct supervision, and (8)
explicitly reserved in its contract with the contractor the right to purchase and donate any
materials to the project that it chose. (Former R865-19-58S.) ThomjLBxos^CaiistrjA
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Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 860 P.2d 324 fUtah 1992V
Although a contract specified that the plaintiff never held title to construction materials,
where he issued purchase orders for the transactions, received invoices from venaors, issued
checks to pay for the materials, and was required under the terms of the contract to insure
the materials, the indicia of sale were sufficient to support a finding that he was tne final
consumer of the materials before they were incorporated into real property. Yeargtn. Inc. v.
Tax Comm'n. 977 P.2d 527 fUtah Ct. ADD. 1999V
EQUIPMENT.
These rules expressly excluded real property and improvements to real property from the
definition of equipment, as that term was used in § 59-12-104. Therefore, the building shells
of manufacturing facilities were not equipment and were subject to tax. (Former R865-1985S.) Morton Int'l. Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581 (Utah
X3SXU
FINANCING FOR IMPROVEMENTS.
A lease agreement, prior to the sale of an improvement to real estate, does not change the
nature of the improvement so that it becomes taxable as a sale of tangible personal property
under § 59-12-103. The rationale for not taxing the sale of improvements to real estate
under these rules is based on the policy of taxing the final consumer of the personal property,
the one who converts the personal property into real property. These rules suggest that
determination of a tax assessment should be based on the physical process of conversion, not
on how the conversion is financed. (Former R865-19-58S.) Superior Soft Water Co. v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, $43 PT2d 525JUJ»h Ct. APP, 1992),
INFORMATION.
The iease or sale of knowledge, information, or data such as mailing lists was taxable as a
personal property transaction when the information was conveyed by a tangible medium such
as printed sheets and magnetic tapes. (Former R865-19-26S.) Mark O. Haroldsen. Inc. v.
State Tax Comm'n. 80S P.2d 176 (Utah 1990^.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
The Commission property levied sales tax on sales by a wholesale construction supply store
(the taxpayer) to out-of-state customers of goods that were delivered to those customers by
the stores agents or were picked up by the customers at the taxpayer's place of business,
when the taxpayer failed to keep adequate records with regard to its sales and was unable to
produce the necessary exemption certificates. (Former R865-23S.) Tummurru Trades. Inc. v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 1990).
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT EXEMPTION.
- NEW OR EXPANDING OPERATIONS.
The provision of this rule defining "new or expanding operations" to require that
manufacturing, processing, or assembling activities must be "substantially different in nature,
character, or purpose from prior activities" (R865-19S-85) is inconsistent with § 59-12-104
and improperly restricts the availability of sales tax exemptions to new products or services.
Newspaper Agency .Corp. v Utah State Tax Comm'n t331±2iAllUt»hJ^J!fiP^X9S51j
cert,
granted, 910 P.2d 425_(Utan 1995).
The provision of this rule defining "new or expanding operations" to require that
manufacturing, processing, or assembling activities must be "begun in a new physical plant
location in Utah" (R865-19S-85) is contrary to § 59-12-104 and impermissibly limits the
availability of the sales tax exemption. Newspaper Agency Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n,
892_P.2d 17 (Utah_Ct._App. 1995), cert, granted, 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 19951.
A sale will be exempt if it aualifies under one of the subparts of R865-19S-85(A)(3) even if
it fails under the other two subparts. Eaton Kenwav. Inc. v. A i d i n g Div. of Utah State Tax
Comm'n,.906 P,_2d_88iIiJLtah 1995).
R865-19S-85(A)(3)(a) reasonably defines "new operations" and is therefore valid. Eaton
Kenway, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 906 P.2d 882 (Utah_lSSSL
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R865-19S-85(A)(3)(c) reasonably defines "expanding operations" as manufacturing
activities that "increase production or capacity" and properly excludes taxable "normal
operating replacements/' a term taken directly from § 59-12-104(15). Eaton Kenway, Inc. v
Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 906 P.2d 882 (Utah 19951.
-

NORMAL OPERATING REPLACEMENTS.
R865-19S-85(A)(6) properly limits "normal operating replacements" to machinery and
equipment that replace existing machinery and equipment of a "similar nature";
replacements that are not of a "similar nature" are not "normal operating" replacements and
thus are eligible for the exemption provided in § 59-12-104(15). Eaton Kenwav. Inc. v.
Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 906 P.2d 882 (Utah 19951.
The language of both § 59-12-104(16) and R865-19S-85 confirms that the normal
operating replacements limitation applies to both new and expanding operations; therefore,
because the Commission reasonably found that petitioner's printing presses were "normal
operating replacements" and because the normal operating replacements limitation applies to
both new and expanding operations, petitioner was not entitled to an exemption under § 5912-104(16). Newspaper Agency Com, v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 938 P.2d
2$$ fUtth I997) r
-

REPLACEMENT OF EXISTING MACHINERY.
Even though new machine clearly increased company's production and capacity, the
commission correctly found that the machine replaced "existing machinery or equipment of a
similar nature" under R865-19S-85. Eaton Kenwav. Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax
Comm'n. 906 P.2d 882 fUtah 1995V
The Supreme Court, applying Eaton Kenwav. Inc. v. Auditing Div.. 906 P.2d 882. 887 (Utah
1995), which stated that "modernizing and upgrading machinery and equipment are normally
done in the regular course of business, even though the replaced items may be in good
working order," and reversing the appellate court's decision, held that this rule is "reasonable
and fairly defines "normal operating replacements'" and valid. Newspaper Agency Corp. v.
Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 938 P.2d 266 (Utah 1997V
MANUFACTURER.
The Tax Commision's rule defining "manufacturer" was invalid because it improperly
restricted the manufacturing sales tax exemption set forth in § 59-12-104(16). (Former
R865-85S-1.) Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 846 P.2d

1304_(Utah 1993).
MINING.
Company owning and operating a phosphate mine which transported ore to its fertilizer
plant via a pipeline owned and operated by a separately incorporated common earner was
liable for the sales tax on electricity furnished by the company to the carrier. SF Phosphates
Ltd. Co. v. Auditmg.Diy., Utah State Tax Comm'n, 972 P.2d 384 (Utah 1998).
PASSAGE OF TITLE.
These rules codified the requirements for determining when title passes and adopted the
passage-of-title test for fixing the moment for determining the tax. Therefore, because
taxpayer did not pass title until delivery, he was obligated to collect and remit sales tax on
his transportation charges. (Former R865-19-71S.) Hales Sand & Gravel. Inc. v. Audit Div..
842 P.2d 887JUtah_1992).
REPAIR OR RENOVATIONS.
These rules did not support taxing, drilling and milling services on logs a railroad company
had previously purchased. The commission's view that drilling and milling are equivalent to
repair or renovation is unsupportable; repair and renovation suggest activities that "fix" an
already manufactured product. The authority to tax services performed on items owned by
the taxpayer is not coextensive with the authority to tax based on services performed prior to
sale. (Former R865-19-51S.) Union Pac. R.R. v. Auditing Div.. 842 P.2d 876 (Utah 1992).
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RESIDENT.
The Utah State Tax Commission has clearly defined the term bona fide nonresident for
purposes of the sales tax exemption. Although the commission's regulation included an
expanded definition of the term "resident" for sales tax purposes beyond the general common
law definition of resident, this is consistent with the well established principle that state tax
exemption statutes are to be strictly construed against the party claiming the exemption.
(Former R873-22-1M.) Putvm v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 837 P.2d 589 (Utah Ct. ADD. 19921.

WARRANTY AGREEMENTS.
The provision of this rule which taxes the purchase of extended warranty agreements
(R865-19S-78(H)) is in harmony with § 59-12-103(l)(g). South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n v.
Auditing Dlv. of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 951 P.2d 218 (Utah 1997^
CITED.
For cases citing this rule or similar former rules, see BJ.-Titan Servs. v. State Tax Comm'n,
842 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992): Heritage Convalescent Ctr. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 953 P.2d
445 (Utah 1997),
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Tab 5

Official Ballot Title:
Shall the Utah Constitution be amended to permit I
Legislature to authorize any state court to adjudica
review, reconsider, or redetermine any matter decid
by the State Tax Commission or by any county boz
of equalization relating to revenue and taxatic
including authorization for application back to July
1994 under specified circumstances?

Tor
^y
Against Q

Proposition
No. 6
RESOLUTION ON REVIEW OF TAX
COMMISSION CASES
Votes cast by the members of the Legislature at the 1998 General Session on final passage:
HOUSE (75 members): Yeas, 66; Nays, 0; Absent, 9.
SENATE (29 members): Yeas, 2S; Nays, 0; Absent, 1.

Impartial Analysis
be appealed to the Utah Supreme Court after review by the Sta
Tax Commission.

Proposition 6 amends the Revenue and Taxation Article of the
Utah Constitution. It permits the Legislature to authorize any state
court to adjudicate, review, reconsider, or redetermine any matter
decided by the State Tax Commission or by a county board of
equalization relating to revenue and-taxation. This proposition
also permits the legislature to make the expansion of the caurt'jf
jurisdiction effective back to July 1, 1994 under specified
circumstances,

Proposed changes
Proposition 6 amends the Utah Constitution to allow tl
Legislature to authorize a state court to adjudicate, reviev
reconsider, or redetermine a. matter decided by the State Ta
Commission or by a county board of equalization relating I
revenue and taxation. This proposition allows the Legislature t
expand the jurisdiction of state courts with respect to decisions c
the State Tax Commission and county boards of equaiizatior
Under that expanded jurisdiction, a court could conduct ai
original, independent proceeding and exercise its own judgment i:
the place of a decision by the State Tax Commission or a decisioi
by a county board of equalization that has received review by thi
State Tax Commission. This proposition also allows the
Legislature to authorize a state court to review directly a count)
board of equalization decision that has not received State Taa
Commission review.
In addition, Proposition 6 gives the Legislature authority tc
make the expansion of the court's jurisdiction effective back to
July 1,1994. This retroactive application would apply to decisions
of the State Tax Commission or county boards of equalization for
which neither a district court, the Court of Appeals, nor the

Current Jaw
The Utah Constitution presently directs the State Tax
Com mission to "administer and supervise the tax laws of the State*'
and specifies other powers of the Commission. Under current state
statute, a district court may affirm or reverse a State Tax
Commission decision or send it back to the Commission for its
fu rr her action. The district court may also grant other relief as long
as the court's actions do not limit State Tax Commission powers set
forth in the Utah Constitution. According to a recent Utah court
decision, the Utah Constitution does not presently allow the
Legislature to authorize a district court to conduct an original,
independent proceeding on a State Tax Commission decision.
The Utah Constitution also directs county boards, of
equalization to adjust and equalize the valuation and assessment of
property within their respective counties, subject to regulation and
control by the State Tax Commission as provided by statute. Under
current state statute, a county board of equalization decision may
38

^ ^ B m e Court has issued a final, unappealable judgment or order,
BBFas long as n vested right is nol enlarged, eliminated, or
Pesfroycd.
Statutory provisions effective on passage of Proposition 6
If Proposition 6 passes, certain provisions of S.B, 62, District
Court Review of Tax Commission Cases, 1998 General vSession,
will become law on January 1,1999. (Other provisions of S.B. 62
have a!rcj\dy become law.) The provisions of S.I3. 62 that become
law upon passage of Proposition 6: 1) grant a district court
jurisdiction lo conduct an original, independent proceeding in
reviewing a final decision issued by the State Tax Commission if
the decision resulted from a formal, administrative proceeding; 2)
expressly grant a district court the power to modify any order
issued by the Stale Tax Commission; and 3) remove language that
restricts the dislricl court's ability to grant other relief in reviewing.
Stale Tax Commission decisions. These statutory provisions are
applied back to July I, J 994 for decisions relating to revenue and
taxation that arc issued by the Slate Tax Commission or county
boards of equalization. This retroactive application applies lo
decisions for which neither a district court, the Court of Appeals*
nor the Supreme Court has issued a final, unappealable judgment
or order and for which application back does nol "enlarge,
eliminate, or destroy a vested right."
S,B, 62 does nol expand state court jurisdiction to review ..directly a county board of equalization decision that has not
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received State Tax Commission review, although Proposition 6
authorizes the Legislature lo do so.
EfTcctive Date
'
V .„_ T -.
Proposition 6 IhJc'eS Effect on January 1, 1999 and authorizes
the legislature to pass laws applying the provisions of Proposition
6 back to July 1, 1994 under specified circumstances.
Fiscal Note
'The State Tax Commission bus identified 31 tax cases
currently pending before Utah stale courts that will be impacted if
Proposition 6 passes. These 31 cases arc already being reviewed by
Utah state courts under current statutes but would be eligible for
review by a state court in an original, independent proceeding if
Proposition 6 passes. The result of an original, independent court
proceeding, in terms of the amount or tax owed by a taxpnycr
involved in a case, may or may nol differ from the result that
would have been reached without die original, independent court
proceeding.
Additionally, the Slate Tax Commission expressed concern that a
broad reading of S.B. 62 would allow court review for any
Commission decision issued since July I„ 1994 that has not received
final, unappealable court action. The potential fiscal impact of such
a reading is uncertain.

Rebuttal To

Arguments For
A vote for Proposition 6 will help ensure fair and
equitable taxation in Utah by re-establishing a tax court in the
state and providing a more taxpayer-favorable place to appeal
tax assessments.
Assume for a minute that you or your company have been
hit with a sales or income tax audit that you believe is unfair.
Or assume that your property value for property tax purposes
doubles in one year's time and you want to appeal. Under
Utah's current tax appeal structure, the "judges" in your appeal
are the very people that imposed the tax on you—either the
county, or the state tax commission. Moreover, if you appeal
the decision of these taxing authorities to court, the appellate
court is required to defer to the judgment of those government
authorities on most issues, giving these government
authorities the benefit of any doubts.
In 1998, the Legislature voted 94-0 to allow you to take
your Tax Commission assessment for an impartial day in
court Approval of this Proposition will make the tax court a
reality, The tax judges will be able to hear all evidence in a
case, and make a ruling based solely on the facts and law,
without paying undo deference to the tax assessing body. The
tax courtwill consist of 6 sitting district court judges who have
tax expertise. Because the judges are already sitting judges,
the court will cost the taxpayers of Utah no additional money.
The judges will continue to hear non-tax cases. To be more
accessible to taxpayers, these judges will travel to any areas of
the state where tax disputes arise.
The Tax Commission does a good job with its duties*
However, isn't it comforting to know that someone
unconnected to the assessing function can review your case.
The United Stares was founded on the principle of checks and
balances, with different branches of government making sure
other branches act appropriately to ensure fairness for all. The
tax court is a check and balance for Utah's tax system,
providing an impartial eye to ensure the system runs smoothly
and fairly for everybody.
Senator Howard A, Stephenson
Representative John Valentine
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'Arguments For Proposition No. 6
(No opposing argument was submitted.)

Arguments Against
(No argument was submitted.)

Rebuttal To
Arguments Against Proposition No. 6
(No opposing argument was submitted.)

